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State, Gender and Institutional Change in Cuba's 
'Special Period': 
The Federation de Mujeres Cubanas 
'We have gone through three periods since the revolution: in the first 
we looked to the state to solve all of our problems, and we managed 
more or less OK. In the second, from 1988, we found the state couldn't 
meet our needs, and we were unable to meet them ourselves. Since 1993 
we no longer rely on the state because we know that it cannot deliver 
what we need. But at least now we can begin to provide for ourselves'. 
Former FMC functionary, now working in an NGO.1 
Introduction. A Debate on Change 
The first half of the 1990s has been a time of particular uncertainty in Cuba, 
a crisis associated, on the one hand, with the collapse of the Soviet system 
and the impact of this on Cuba, and, on the other, with the emergency 
associated with the 'special period' .2 When, in 1990, Cuba was officially 
declared to be in the 'special period in peacetime', this was a signal that the 
campaign of rectification,3 begun in 1986 had ended and that a new era, one 
of even greater austerity and resulting from the collapse of the Soviet system, 
was at hand. As subsidies and trade with the Eastern bloc plummeted after 
1989, the Cuban economy, already faltering throughout the latter part of the 
1980s, suffered a severe if anticipated shock. The years 1989-1993 registered 
the lowest growth rates since the revolution in 1959 - a near 50% fall in 
GSP.4 The crisis was reflected not only in the sharp contraction of the 
economy, but also in the acute shortage of basic goods and energy supplies 
1 Author's interview, January 1996. All interviews have been anonymised, 
some at the request of respondents. 
2 The 'special period', inaugurated in 1990, was a response to the foreign 
exchange and fiscal deficits caused by the cessation of economic support from 
the Soviet bloc. It stressed self-reliance, rationing, across the board cuts and 
moral incentives (see Deere, 1991, and Pastor and Zimbalist, 1995). 
3 On the campaign for the 'rectification of errors' see Eckstein (1991), 
Mesa-Lago (1989) and Pastor and Zimbalist (1995). 
4 Cuban economists estimate that: 'La caida acumulada del producto bruto 
social global desde 1989 a 1993 se aproxima aun 45%.' Carranza et al. (1995). 
The Global Social Product (GSP) differs from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
as a measure of economic growth. Among other things, it excludes non-
productive sectors such as health and education. 
which hit the Cuban population hard.5 
While government policies, foreign investment and tourism had brought 
some alleviation of the worst hardships from the middle of 1994 onwards, 
there could be little doubt that the political and economic model espoused for 
the past 37 years was in crisis. Among the population there was a widespread 
recognition that the system had to yield to the forces of change, while the 
political class was preoccupied with the pace and direction of such change. 
That this process had accelerated over the last few years, beyond what was 
initially foreseen, was evident from the rush in 1995 to legalise new property 
relations and economic activities with the passing of a revised property law, 
the legalisation of small businesses, and the announcement of new taxation 
measures effective from 1 January 1996. The spread of markets throughout 
the island, and of informal sector activities, most notable in Havana in the 
rapid expansion of the paladares or semi-private eating houses, and in the 
omnipresent jinoteras in the tourist areas, were evidence of the multi- faceted 
nature of the move towards a greater role for the market.6 
For any society, the removal of its ideological and strategic patron and a 
near 50% collapse in national output over a f ive year period would be 
challenge enough. Combined as this was with an unrelenting and vengeful 
pressure from the USA and with an apparent inability of the regime itself to 
take any political initiatives, the situation was especially acute. Yet it was in 
this very situation of protracted crisis, in which the dangers of a violent 
upheava l and of the loss of the very cons ide rab le social gains of the 
revolutionary period were ever-present, that a debate opened up on the future 
of the Cuban political system in which, for the first time since the triumph of 
1959, the possibility of alternatives was creatively explored. Both in Havana 
and in Miami voices were raised which sought to chart a course for Cuba that 
would navigate the worst dangers facing it. Such a course would avoid the 
imposition on Cuba of 'shock therapy', to be compounded by the revanchist 
proclivities of returning exiles,7 but would also demand from the regime a 
5 In the second half of the 1980s the Cuban economy stagnated, with an 
average growth rate of less than 0.2 %. Pastor and Zimbalist (1995) calculate that 
the real GDP growth rate in 1990 was -3.1%, in 1991 -14.0%, and in 1993 it 
was -20.0%. However, by 1994 there were signs of recovery with GDP rising 
by 0.7%, then by 2.5% in 1995. Government budget projections for 1996 were 
for a growth rate of 5.0%. 
6 Paladar, literally 'palate' or 'taste', i.e. a semi-private eating house; 
jinotera, literally 'female jockey', i.e. a form of casual prostitution. 
7 The largest exile group, the Miami-based Cuban American National 
Foundation, has called for shock therapy as the solution for Cuba's economic 
problems. 
political change consonant with the economic reforms it was introducing. 
Examples of such views from within the island can be found in material 
produced within Cuba during the 1990s by semi-official and independent 
groups, and in analyses attuned to such changes produced abroad.8 Thinking 
along these lines, from within Cuban research institutes, can be found in a 
volume of papers presented at an international workshop on democracy held 
in Havana in 1994.9 One contribution, written from a position that stressed 
the achievements of the revolution, argued that political liberalisation was 
both urgent and possible in contemporary Cuba.10 The author, Haroldo Dilla 
of the American Studies Insti tute, had little time for the argument that 
political change should be postponed until the economy had righted itself, or 
for the view, often voiced by supporters of regime dogma abroad, that 
democratic and constitutional politics were not 'appropriate' to Cuba. While 
critical of US hostility, he also dismissed the claim that the confrontation 
with Washington made such a democratisation impossible. 
In addressing the question of what a desirable model for democracy in 
Cuba should be, Dilla advanced two broad arguments that can serve to guide 
an assessment of the Cuban past and of possible future paths. On the one 
hand, he argued that while the Cuban leadership had enjoyed considerable 
legitimacy in the initial revolutionary years, and had continued to do so 
because of its social achievements, it had failed to meet the political aspir-
ations of the population. The 'institutionalisation' introduced in the mid-
1970s, associated with the 1976 socialist constitution and the system of poder 
popular, had allowed some decision-making powers at local level, but had 
done little or nothing to lessen the degree of centralisation and 'verticalism' 
in the political system as a whole.11 Citing both Marx and Huntington, the 
paper stressed that economic change, especially that associated with the 
'special pe r iod ' , could not be disassociated from political reform, i .e . 
democratisation. On the other hand, the very crisis of the Cuban system was 
not just a result of events in the USSR or of US pressure: it was a result of 
the very success of the revolution itself, which had produced a population 
more educated, more politically conscious, and more experienced in mass 
participation than the one that had existed before. This was all the more so 
because of the social effects of three decades of emigration (of much of the 
8 See the interviews with nine Cuban intellectuals in Havana in NACLA, 
Vol. XXIX (Sept/Oct 1995). For examples of this view in Miami see La 
Opinion, the news-sheet of the Coordinadora Social Democrata de Cuba. 
9 Dilla (1995). 
10 Dilla's essay is entitled 'Cuba: Cual es la democracia deseable?'. 
11 Dilla (1995). 
middle classes) and the upward mobility of those hitherto disenfranchised: the 
crisis of the Cuban revolution had, therefore, occurred at the time when 
Cuban society was best able to respond creatively to it. 
The discussion that fo l lows, part of a broader comparative study of 
socialist states and their transitional periods, is a reflection on this debate, 
conducted within Cuba and abroad. Its particular focus is on one of the mass 
organisations, the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), and on the place of 
gender issues within the current period of change.12 Moreover, it seeks to 
locate the discussion of gender and of the FMC in the context of the two 
arguments summarised above, l inking the issue of polit ical change and 
l iberal isat ion to the impact of economic change, and, at the same time, 
showing how the social achievements of the Castro period have created a 
situation in which a creative, revitalising response to the present crisis may 
yet be possible. As Dilla himself argues: ' . . . .Civil society has changed. In 
the f i rs t place, its popular sectors are today more educated, with better 
political formation and greater ability to participate. New generations have 
entered poli t ical l i fe carrying a message of polit ical commitment , but 
demanding new spaces and renovated forms in which to exercise it. Half of 
the population - women - is hoping for greater opportunities to express its 
aspirations in an autonomous manner against a patriarchal order weakened, 
but not destroyed, by more than thirty years of revolutionary life'.13 
Cuban officials avoid the term ' transit ion' , doubtless on account of its 
evocation of the 'double transitions' in Eastern Europe or in Latin America, 
which involved a l iberal isat ion of both the state and the economy, in a 
process of 'redemocratisation'. This explains why, instead, the new policy 
stance in Cuba is referred to simply as 'the special period', itself implying 
exceptionality with the door still open to a modified return to 'normality' if 
all goes well. Yet the Cuban leadership has embarked, albeit reluctantly, on 
a transition of sorts, a 'creeping perestroika', the direction of which is, for 
both internal and international reasons, irreversible. The evident hope of the 
Cuban leadership is that, if they can restore a measure of economic growth 
and maintain basic provisions, they can buy time and thereby avoid political 
upheaval: in private they defend their position by arguing that political 
change will come, but only after the economy has been revitalised; their past 
record, and current rhetoric, suggest that a rather different agenda, that of 
postponing political change as long as possible, is uppermost in their minds. 
The p u r p o s e of this paper is to re f lec t on the po ten t ia l fo r change , in 
12 This study draws on two research visits to Cuba, one in 1981 the other in 
January 1996 as well as on other comparative work, referenced below, on social 
policy and regime transition in socialist states. 
13 Dilla (1995). 
particular for the female population, and the contradictory forces operating 
on Cuban society to-day, within the broader context of the current crisis of 
Cuban society and the political legacy of nearly four decades of revolution. 
The 'Woman Question' and the Revolutionary State 
The FMC is one of the largest of the mass organisations in Cuba:14 in 1990 
it c la imed a membersh ip of 3 .2 mi l l ions , or 80% of the adult female 
population. The FMC is examined here with three concerns in mind. First, 
to what extent does it confirm the thesis of Cuban exceptionalism,15 and 
show itself to be an organisation different from those found in the former 
Soviet bloc? Secondly, to what extent has its record indicated a capacity for 
adaptation and flexibility in the face of change? Thirdly, how far have its 
present priorities reflected an awareness of the needs of its constituency and 
equipped it for the changes ahead? 
An analysis of the Women 's Federation is of interest for three main 
reasons. The first is because in membership terms it is not only the largest 
mass organisation in Cuba, but the largest women's organisation ever seen 
in Latin America.16 Secondly, its record raises questions about the nature 
of the regime and its legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency.17 The record 
14 Other than the FMC, the most important interest groups represented in 
mass organisations are la Asociacion Nacional de Pequenos Agricultores 
(ANAP), the Comites de Defensa de la Revolucion (CDRs), the Central de 
Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) and the Union de Juventud Comunista (UJC). 
15 This is the official regime view, also found among some of Cuba's 
supporters. For an example of the view that Cuba is not comparable to other 
cases of state socialism see Lutyens (1995). Lutyens writes: '...recent feminist 
conclusions about socialism and socialist women cannot be automatically 
extended to the Cuban case' (p. 100). 
16 Eva Peron 's Peronist Women's Party, founded in order to mobilise 
support for the Argentine regime in 1949, had at the time of the 1951 elections 
500,000 members, with 3,600 branches in the country as a whole (Miller, 1991), 
at a time when Argentina's total population was substantially larger than that of 
Cuba in the 1980s, the latter being under 11 million. 
17 The unexpectedly rapid collapse of the former Soviet bloc has shown how 
difficult it is to make assumptions about the way that the effects of state policies 
are experienced by their populations. Claims regarding the legitimacy of 
communist parties cannot be tested and are therefore based on speculation rather 
than on hard evidence: while it is probable that, despite the denial of political 
freedoms, such regimes can, for social and patriotic reasons, enjoy legitimacy, 
it is also evident from the eastern European experiences that, over time, 
of the Cuban revolution in regard to 'women's emancipation' is an achieve-
ment celebrated both internally and to some degree externally as evidence of 
socialism's superiority over capitalism. As with the record on healthcare 
del ivery, the FMC and the Communist Party are joint ly credited with 
achieving above average levels of progress for the Latin American region on 
key indicators such as female mortality, educational levels, legal rights and 
employment. This is argued to have provided the regime with legitimacy and 
considerable support among the female population. If this latter claim were 
to be substantiated then the Cuban case differs from the experience of Eastern 
Europe and suggests a greater degree of support for government institutions 
than prevailed there; it also suggests that the FMC may enjoy a correspon-
dingly greater degree of effect iveness in responding to the needs of its 
constituency. 
A th i rd reason for focus ing on the FMC is that its membersh ip and 
constituency contain a high proportion of those who are most likely to be 
threatened by any process of adjustment that eventuates from attempts to 
resolve Cuba's economic crisis. As studies of the social effects of adjustment 
have shown, the move towards a greater role for the market can be expected 
to exacerbate social inequalities and deepen gender divisions.18 In Cuba's 
transition too, there is already evidence that women suffer a disproportionate 
burden of the costs of adjustment, and this trend is likely to accelerate. If the 
current regime is to avoid the fate of the Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan 
elections of 1990, when a majority of those who voted for their opponents 
were women, it will have to address the fact of the gendered nature of econ-
omic restructuring and be seen to be taking adequate measures to offset them. 
Much depends then, on the character of the FMC. 
The official account of the FMC attributes its origins, in predictable but 
by no means inaccurate manner, to socialist principle combined with what 
must in rather more critical terms be characterised as paternalism. According 
to these accounts it was 'Fidel himself who set up the women's organisation, 
the Federation of Cuban Women, in 1960, and who appointed his sister-in-
law Vilma Espin as its head, a position she has enjoyed ever since.19 
stagnation in the political field can undermine this legitimacy and that, once 
possibilities for social advance other than through the Party become available, 
much of the regime's support can disappear, and in a very short period of time. 
18 See Afshar and Dennis (1992); and, for a recent discussion of the broader 
issues of macro-economic policy and its gendered effects, see World Develop-
ment (1995). 
19 Espin had been active in the revolutionary movement but she was at first 
unconvinced about the need for such an organisation, and later recalled wonder-
ing: 'Why do we have to have a women's organisation? I had never been 
The goals of the FMC were set with a clear view to organis ing and 
mobilising women for the defence and consolidation of the revolution. In 
organisat ional funct ion as well as in structure it followed the pattern 
established in other socialist states, operating as a 'mass organisation' under 
the general direction of the Party - in Lenin's terms acting as 'a transmission 
belt ' . Its leadership was drawn from the handful of women who were close 
to the guerrilla command in the 1950s and who, like Vilma Espin herself, had 
been active in the pre-revolutionary struggles. The authority of the revolution 
was thus present at the apex of the organisation, as formal endorsement but 
also as hegemonic control. 
In its goals, organisation and ideology there was little to differentiate the 
FMC from women's organisations elsewhere in the communist world. It 
sought to achieve the political mobilisation of women in order to consolidate 
political power and to implement a socialist programme of economic and 
social transformation.20 These goals were expressed in terms of an ethical 
commitment to 'women's emancipation', premised on women's entry into 
work, formal juridical quality and social rights to health and education.21 
Like its counterparts elsewhere, the FMC was charged with the task of 
helping to improve women's situation and to work for equality within the 
context of carrying out party policy. It was responsible for channelling 
demands and grievances to the leadership and could, therefore, perform the 
role of a mild form of pressure group. Most of its effor ts were directed 
towards political and ideological work among women, which in the early 
years aimed to mobilise them into campaigns to extend basic health and 
literacy to the population22 and into voluntary work schemes.23 It was also 
discriminated against. I had my career as a chemical engineer. I never suffered.' 
Quinn (1977). 
20 'The basic function of the FMC is to incorporate women into the construc-
tion of socialism elevating the general political, cultural and technical level of 
the nation. All the FMC's activities are designed precisely to mobilise women, 
organise them and improve their conditions'. Espin in 1971 (in Espfn, 1985). 
21 For comparative perspectives on women and socialism see Jancar (1978), 
Molyneux (1981) and Turgeon (1989). The strategy of 'emancipating' women 
by drawing them into the labour force was justified by reference to the theories 
of Engels on capitalism and the division of labour, wherein women's oppression 
was based on their exclusion from the labour market. 
22 The literacy campaign of 1961 involved thousands of FMC members who 
acted as 'loving mothers' to 70,000 literacy workers, performing such tasks as 
delivering their mail, making their beds and cooking, as well as replacing 
schoolteachers who were involved in the campaign. 
involved in popularising legislative change such as the Family Code (1975) 
and the socialist constitution (1976) and in helping to realise other aspects of 
government policy which directly affected women and the family. 
While claiming to represent women's interests and acknowledging that 
women did, indeed, have distinct concerns, it sought to define these in terms 
of party goals. In reality, such official women's organisations had little scope 
for independent initiatives, but there were some cases where they successful-
ly challenged party policy on a limited range of issues. In two much cited 
examples the FMC opposed attempts to follow the Soviet practice of banning 
women f r o m more than three hundred jobs on ' h e a l t h ' g rounds , and 
successfully lobbied to permit men to attend to family members in hospitals 
where previously only women were allowed.24 
Integral to the issue of the FMC's capacities and programme is that of the 
character of the revolutionary state itself, and more generally that of what 
concepts can be used to describe the socialist regimes of modern Europe and 
the third world, and, in this particular context, the degree to which Cuba can 
be assimilated to them. While this is not the place to go in detail into these 
issues, two points can be made. First, while not 'totalitarian', in the sense of 
wholly monolithic or unchanging, and for a time at least enjoying some 
popular support, the socialist regimes of the communist bloc did exhibit a 
high degree of centralised control by the party elite, through the bureaucracy 
of party and state. The reality sometimes fell short of their aspiration, and an 
autonomous civil society continued in some measure to exist (in the family, 
churches, underground intellectual groups, informal, often illegal, economic 
activity), but these were nonetheless authoritarian societies. Moreover, while 
the ruling parties themselves sought to explain and legitimate their activities 
through appeals to 'the masses' and to engage in various forms of 'participa-
tory democracy' (elections, mobilisations, mass meetings, consultations etc.), 
these were measures which in no instance left the initiative to the peoples of 
these countries: the initiative always lay at the top, as the record showed. In 
overall terms, the party leaderships put through policies that were designed, 
in addition to guaranteeing their own power, to promote economic develop-
ment and social change. They implemented a broad top-down programme of 
socialist modernisation that was supposed to lead to the emergence of a 
superior form of social and poli t ical existence.2 5 This idea of progress 
23 Voluntary work was a continuing feature of the Cuban revolution; the 
FMC mobilised women by calling at people's homes. 
24 Bengelsdorf (1988). 
25. Thus Dilla characterises the Cuban system as 'un entramado administra-
tive complejo, centralizado e impenetrable por la poblacion y sus representantes 
electos'. 
sustained the revolutionary elites, just as it justified repression of alternative 
views and policies. Policies on all issues, women included, need to be seen 
in this context.26 
Writers on Cuba have been divided as to the nature of this model, but 
equally as to how far Cuba fits the standard identified above. The reasons for 
stressing difference have been often put: the Cuban revolution initially had 
a popular, nationalist and democratic character, and in its first phase was 
devoid of overt Leninist authoritarianism and direct Soviet influence;27 the 
revolution enjoyed widespread support on patriotic and social grounds and a 
high degree of participation; despite widespread and continued violations of 
internal norms of legal and human rights practice, its level of coercion was 
significantly less than in other communist states;28 not least, the regime in 
Cuba survived the collapse of communism elsewhere. As far as gender 
relations were concerned, Cuba also exhibited less of the puritanism of other 
Soviet bloc states, an aspect of the island's society which outside observers 
too often interpreted as evidence of women's emancipation. All these 
arguments are important and relevant: they do not, however, gainsay the fact 
that the post-1959 state, for a combination of shared necessity of all post-
revolutionary regimes and deliberate imitation of Soviet models, came to 
exhibit, where it did not do so from the start, many of the distinguishing 
features of such a regime. 
The character of the Cuban Revolution owes much to the particularities of 
Cuban history and is often presented as a singular, autonomous, occurrence, 
but it needs also to be understood in its conjunctural context; it was born at 
the end of a decade which had witnessed the accelerating momentum of the 
Cold War, and itself became embroiled in the confrontation between East and 
West in the Missile Crisis of 1962. The tense international situation helped 
to lock Cuba into a mould, as an ally and showcase of the Soviet Union, 
which had profound effects on its population as a whole, ones which were 
clearly gendered in character. Although enjoying considerable popular 
support, which continued for some time after the initial confrontation with 
the USA, the Cuban leadership had nonetheless set in place a system by the 
mid-1970s which, modelled on the USSR, was premised on centralised, 
26 Molyneux (1981). 
27 In support of this argument is the criticism of Cuba by eastern bloc 
analysts for its 'adventurism' in the Guevarist phase. See Pade (1988) for an 
East German view. 
28 The Cuban record on repression is not, however, without its gendered 
elements; the persistent persecution of homosexuals, many of whom were sent 
to the UMAP labour camps, is among the most reprehensible instances. See 
Young (1981). 
bureaucrat ic control , and, without Soviet subsidies, was economically 
unsustainable. The Cuban Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1965, was a 
highly centralised body, modelled on the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union: not even its most uncritical sympathisers could claim that it differed 
in any major respects from this paradigm. The Cuban press was as controlled 
as that of the eastern European states. The party bureaucracy, dominated by 
men, sought to direct all social and political life; if the secret police were less 
evident than in the USSR and its allies, other bodies - notably the CCP itself 
and the committees for the defence of the revolution, the CDRs - performed 
analogous functions. The political process was, despite a greater use of 
flamboyant mass meetings, and a more sustained commitment to participation 
through voluntary labour in the development efforts of the state, broadly 
similar. 
Much was made, in Cuba itself and by supporters abroad, of the personal-
ity and role of Fidel himself: but even this undoubtedly distinctive feature, 
hailed in an early work of solidarity by Jean-Paul Sartre as 'the dialectical 
un i ty of F ide l and the m a s s e s ' , was no guarantee of democracy or of 
administrative efficiency. Changes introduced to reform the system increased 
participation at local level, but left party control of the state machinery intact. 
The establishment from the early 1970s of local assemblies with elected 
bodies, first at provincial and then at national level, achieved a degree of 
local involvement in decis ion-making, but fell far short of democratic 
change . 2 9 A t rop ica l , i nd igenous , reg ime it may have been, but in its 
essential features it was, and remains, a highly bureaucratised state of the 
standard socialist type. If this was true of the party and state in general, it 
was also true of policy on what, in conventional socialist terminology was 
referred to as 'the woman question', and the ideological and organisational 
forms this took. Whatever claims it may make, the FMC would find it 
difficult to maintain that, in the annals of socialist states and their mass 
organisations, it had contributed much originality to this genre. 
29 This was the system known as poder popular, 'popular power'. Whatever 
the leeway on local issues, these were of a very limited character, pertaining to 
questions of municipal administration, and the upper echelons of the system, at 
province and national level, were under CCP control. The significance of the 
National Assembly can be gauged from the fact that it met for only a short 
period every year. It was noticeable that the term repeatedly used to identify the 
function of this system was canalizar las inquietudes de las masas (interview 
with Jorge Hart Davalos, member of the Asamblea Provincial, Havana, March 
1981). 
The FMC in the 1980s: Adaptation and Resistance 
The combined e f f ec t s of C u b a ' s inser t ion into the Soviet b loc , the 
reformulation of Cuban political and cultural activity along Eastern bloc 
lines, US-enforced international isolation and the regime's own controls over 
intellectual life all but succeeded in insulating the revolution from the major 
international currents of social and political thought until the early 1980s. It 
was then that , in response to a variety of related circumstances, some 
internal, some international, a measure of opening up began to occur. The 
exodus of 120,000 Cubans from Mariel in 1980 was followed by a loosening 
of some control over economic and social life, with a small private sector 
being allowed to develop in the service and agricultural domains, and a 
greater - if still limited - measure of contact was permitted with the Western 
world. The FMC was perhaps more exposed to these processes than some of 
the other mass organisations, if only because the UN Decade for Women of 
1975-1985, and the Latin American presence within it, became an important 
and new focus of its international activity.30 
By the later 1970s it had become evident that the FMC was no longer 
operating just within the old socialist policy universe, but also existed in 
tension with two complementary forces - one coming from outside, from a 
self-confident international women's movement which had strong regional 
counterparts in Latin America,31 the other generated internally by women's 
increasing expectations and self-assertiveness. In retrospect it can be seen 
that the UN Decade was a defining moment for the debate on women's place 
30 Hitherto much of the FMC's international activity was developed within 
the context of two concerns. One arose from its membership of the Soviet bloc 
and involved exchange visits by delegations from ' f raternal ' states and 
membership of international communist organisations. Vilma Espin had been 
active in the Soviet controlled International Federation of Democratic Women 
established in 1960, and acted as Vice President for a time. The other - regional 
- concern was Latin America, where efforts were directed at developing 
solidarity for revolutionary currents approved by the Castro leadership. See 
Miller (1991), one of the few analysts who has examined the importance of 
international links in the Latin American Women's movement. 
31 The FMC had at f irst remained aloof from the regional feminist 
Encuentros, but their members began to attend from 1988 when four delegates 
went to the meeting in Taxco, Mexico. There they were exposed to a variety of 
different feminisms (including that of the Sandinista delegates from Nicaragua), 
at a time when there was also emerging a less orthodox lef t , one more 
sympathetic than its predecessors to feminist ideas. 
in society in the communist states.32 As they saw it, the communist states 
had a 'superior record' on women's rights and social indicators preferable to 
most of the capitalist states; the Decade presented them with an opportunity 
to make their case and to participate in the bid for UN resources. Many an 
off ic ia l women ' s organisat ion declared itself to be a non-governmental 
organisat ion for the purposes of this exercise and the FMC, too, duly 
followed suit. It was in the context of regional meetings for Latin America 
that the Cuban delegates also encountered the diverse currents of activism 
within the women's movements of Latin America, including one for which 
they had hitherto had little but contempt - feminism.33 
As far as f emin i sm i tself was concerned , 3 4 the FMC had since its 
inception maintained an attitude of open hostility to it and this remained 
unchanged throughout the 1970s. The off ic ia l posit ion of the FMC, in 
keeping with the standard Soviet line, attributed women's subordination to 
capitalist imperialism, a system which both men and women should unite 
against. Feminism was seen as 'bourgeois' and divisive, and in its insistence 
on autonomous organisational forms, at variance with the FMC's acceptance 
of 'democratic centralism' under overall Party control. Feminist writings 
were therefore banned, and there was never any debate with feminist theory 
within the FMC or beyond it. Vilma Espin insisted that the FMC was a 
'feminine rather than a feminist' organisation and clarified the difference on 
the eve of the UN Decade for Women explaining that: 'We never fought for 
partial demands, we were always conscious that the problem of women is a 
part of the whole society and integrally related to the struggle of all the 
people for their liberation, to men and women together sweeping aside the 
very foundations of capitalist society to build a new life.'35 
In 1977 Espin continued in her refusal to be identified with feminism, but 
rather than offering a blanket denunciation, she was careful to identify the 
main enemy as feminism of the North American variety, i.e. liberal, non-
32 I have argued this at greater length in Molyneux (1990) and (1991). Other 
developments of the time, noticeably the increased concern of states with human 
rights, something to which the USSR and its European allies also had to pay lip 
service, played a parallel role. 
33 See Sternbach et al. (1992) for a discussion of Latin American feminisms 
and for details of the Encuentros. 
34 That there are different feminisms as well as different women's move-
ments, alerts us to the heterogeneity of women's interests, and to the varying 
ways in which they are socially constructed. But what most definitions of 
feminism agree upon is that as a social movement and body of ideas it challenges 
the structures and power relations that produce female subordination. 
35 Espin (1990). 
socialist and radical variants: 'We have never had a feminist movement. We 
hate that. We hate the feminist movement in the United States. We consider 
what we are doing is part of the struggle. We see these movements in the 
USA which have conceived struggles for equality of women against men! 
That is absurd! For these femin is t s to say they are revo lu t ionar ies is 
ridiculous!'36 
However, the FMC was not able to sustain this negative position entirely: 
as feminism began to attain greater support within the Latin American left, 
and even acquired a popular following in the region, the policy shifted to one 
of co-optation. A gradual absorption of feminist issues into the policy process 
occurred, urged on by UN women's advocacy. A handful of younger women, 
sympathetic to feminism, began to work within the FMC, and later, a few 
were even sent to Europe, some to England, to study gender issues. At the 
same time, pressure from within the island had been mounting. By the mid-
seventies, it was evident that the Cuban record on 'women's emancipation' 
was, in its own terms, in need of improvement. Women's participation in the 
organs of institutionalised power, particularly those with any real authority, 
remained at strikingly low levels.37 Moreover, daily life for women in 
command economies was hard, especially where there was reliance on a 
considerable degree of mass part icipation and voluntary work. These 
problems had become all too apparent from within as well as from outside 
due to the growing international scrutiny to which Cuba was subjected in 
feminist fora in Latin America and in activities of the Decade. 
Although, in contrast to several countries of the Soviet bloc, no dissident 
feminist groups or writ ing emerged in Cuba itself, the leadership was 
prompted into a growing awareness of the problems faced by women in work, 
in political life and in the family, and the difficulties women had in managing 
everyday life. As the seventies progressed, although the US embargo took 
much of the blame, public disillusion, as well as scepticism about the FMC's 
role in regard to women, set in. The Party had counted on the substantial 
involvement of women at the base of the political pyramid, in the institution 
of popular power and in the CDRs. Here women carried out the tasks of 
community management, and vigilancia (neighbourhood watch), and those 
who were integradas38 helped to mobilise women to participate in national 
campaigns. These women, too, voiced their grievances against the system, 
making persistent demands for improved childcare, housing and transport, 
36 Quinn (1977). 
37 Women constituted 23.91 % of Party members in 1988 and 18.21 % of the 
Central Committee. Until 1985 there were no women in the Politburo (Lutyens, 
1995). 
38 Meaning activists in one of the mass organisations, or in the Party. 
and longer opening hours for shops. These areas, neglected in what was in 
many other respects an exemplary record of public provision, were far from 
the concerns of the FMC. 
From the mid-seventies, galvanised perhaps by its participation in the UN 
Decade, there occurred a shif t in emphasis towards the achievement of 
greater sexual equality and the enhancing of women's political participation. 
The Family Code of 1975, modelled on the East German legislation passed 
a year before, laid the basis for a campaign to increase male responsibilities 
within the household. This phase of greater awareness of the need to address 
the problems women faced, dubbed the 'revolution within the revolution'39 
by one analyst, saw a greater emphasis on improving women's situation 
overall, an emerging critique of gender divisions in everyday life and a 
revised FMC agenda showing more sensitivity to the kinds of issues which 
had been raised within women's movements. The film A Portrait of Teresa 
shown in 1979 offered a subtle critique not just of Cuban machismo and the 
double standard in sexual mores, but of a system which demanded so much 
of its women.40 In the early 1980s, in the period of modest liberalisation, the 
FMC continued to amplify its scope, taking up some important issues, 
particularly with regard to working women, who while not the majority in the 
membership nonetheless constituted the majority of Congress delegates. In 
1984 Cuba hos ted the p r epa ra to ry reg iona l meet ing for the W o m e n ' s 
Conference marking the end of the UN Decade. This was attended by Latin 
American feminists, many of international repute; some, known to have a 
position of critical support with regard to Cuba, were granted an audience 
with Castro himself. One participant recalled that this seemed 'indicative of 
some kind of reconciliation with feminism, yet how much this was a genuine 
accommodation and how much window-dressing is hard to say'.4 1 In any 
event, the FMC's Congress of 1985 seemed to many observers to show signs 
of a greater sensitivity in its handling of gender issues than had been evident 
in the past. 
None of this, however, was accompanied by significant changes in the 
style of work of the FMC, or in the internal character of the organisation 
which continued much as before. The 1980 Congress had noted that the work 
at local level in the delegations and blocks was unsat isfactory, and that 
attendance was falling in the study circles.42 This decline continued through-
39 Stubbs (1994). 
40 Film has served both as an expression of discontent and as a safety valve 
in the communist states. 
41 Author's interview, 1996. 
42 Smith and Padula (1996). 
out the 1980s; in 1985 Espin had to defend the very exis tence of the 
organisat ion in the face of harsh attacks on its performance, exciting 
speculation that it might cease to function. There appeared to be a disjuncture 
between the revitalisation taking place within official discourse and the 
practice of the organisation itself. 
The character and priorities of the FMC could not, however, be detached 
f rom general trends in society as a whole. In the mid-1980s the limited 
process of economic liberalisation was halted. In one of those sharp counter-
moves characteristic of socialist states, Castro turned against the farmers' 
markets and closed them down, arguing that they had led to the emergence 
of social inequa l i t i es and worse , a co r rup t , paras i t ic sector that was 
undermining the revolution. This did not at first greatly impact upon the 
FMCs agenda, and it appeared to maintain a commitment to the tenor of the 
1985 Congress. Yet in response to pressures of a quite different kind, it was 
called upon to undergo a revitalising transformation which came from 
dramatic changes in the policies of the Cuban state as a whole: just as the 
Soviet bloc was embarking on its reforms, and indeed to some extent perhaps 
because of this very fac t , Cuba took a very d i f f e ren t pa th , that of the 
'rectification of errors' campaign, marking a return to earlier policies and to 
slogans designed to save the revolution from its internal weaknesses. 
Rectification occasioned much triumphalist rhetoric from within and was 
greeted by at least some writers abroad as proof of the vitality of the Cuban 
revolution. It gained some popular support from its attack on bureaucratic 
inertia, privilege and corruption, and from the opportunity it afforded for 
greater public discussion about the social problems Cubans faced. On the 
other hand the suppression of the nascent private sector was accompanied by 
a political clampdown, designed, in part, to pre-empt infection from the 
growing mood of reform in the USSR itself and to prevent a recurrence of the 
Mariel crisis of 1980. The meaning of the rectification period was evident in 
the critical manner in which the Cuban press reported, or often failed to 
report, events in the USSR and eastern Europe - which contrasted with the 
regime's support for the Chinese party in their suppression of the Tien An 
Men demonstrations in June 1989. Signs of political unease within the regime 
were also evident: in one of the most dramatic such moments in the history 
of the Cuban revolution, senior military officers, close allies of Castro and 
heroes of the internationalist activities in Angola and elsewhere, were tried 
and executed in what independent observers saw as an unfair and politically 
motivated trial. The truth of what occurred in the Ochoa trial may never be 
known: that something serious was wrong, and that Ochoa was shot in order 
to emphasise the need for unquestioning obedience of the regime, was not in 
doubt. Such were not the actions of a regime confident of its direction or 
united in its intentions. 
If judged by economic indicators, the consequences of rectification were 
a fa i lure , in that the general or ientat ion of the economy did not change 
substantially in this period and the policies pursued did little to halt the 
coming crisis. At best, it merely staved off , in the name of a return to an 
unattainable socialist purity, the reforms which Cuban society needed; at 
wors t , it buil t up fur ther poli t ical discontent and fur ther distorted the 
economy. Trade and other links with eastern Europe were maintained until 
1990. The economy as a whole returned to the more centralised, unrespon-
sive but still functioning, mode of the 1970s. 
In any event, as far as women were concerned, there was evidence of a 
continuing commitment to address some of their needs and some of the social 
problems which involved women: measures were taken to increase childcare 
provision following demands made at the 1985 congress, and a greater stress 
was placed on the need to share housework, in line with the 1975 Family 
Code; there was increased provision of contraception, and renewed efforts 
at sex education in attempts to reduce the high rate of teenage pregnancies. 
At the same t ime , more e f f o r t s were made to incorpora te women into 
economic activity, with the result that their participation in the labour force 
grew.43 In terms of policy, it could be argued that the FMC and the Cuban 
state in general maintained a gender-aware policy stance in the rectification 
period,44 and its rhetoric reflected some of the concerns of its constituency. 
But against this posi t ive interpretat ion other considerations should be 
regis tered: the overall concern of the rectification period was that of 
improving the productivity of the labour force, and mobilising large numbers 
of 'voluntary ' workers. This mass mobilisation was not without its social 
costs, resulting from 'a crisis in time management' as people struggled to 
fulfil the multiple demands made upon them. 'Participation' there was, but 
to what extent it could be taken as a sign of support for the regime is difficult 
to say. Vo lun tee r ing for such work was o f t en the only way to gain a 
promotion at work, housing points or access to scarce goods. It was arguably 
considerations of regime survival, above all, that determined the policy of the 
FMC in this period as in others. Whether in the increase in the number of 
43 As part of this effort, the FMC established a homeworkers programme 
which in 1989 involved some 62,000 women, many of whom were seamstresses, 
and none of whom enjoyed the social protection enjoyed by employees. The 
FMC did seek redress on this, but without success. (Smith and Padula, 1996). 
44 See Lutyens (1995) for a positive assessment of this period. Lutyens also 
claims that 'A look at the situation of Cuban women in the rectification period 
shows where their cumulative gains and current circumstances contrast with the 
deteriorating conditions of other post-socialist women'. The point, however, is 
that Cuba and Eastern Europe cannot be compared since they were not at 
comparable stages of the adjustment process; indeed Cuba's had barely begun. 
childcare centres, women in work, or the concern with teenage pregnancies 
and abortion, these policy responses reflected above all the concerns of a 
state worried about the deepening economic and social crisis it was facing. 
It was probably less to do with an acceptance of the Decade's parameters on 
gender issues or of greater sympathy for feminism, than with the increasingly 
evident crisis of revolutionary institutions, including the FMC, and the 
intensifying pressures on women and the family.4 5 More generally, the 
underlying structures of state and economy, and the assumptions that had 
prevailed since the 1960s, remained unchanged. 
This was reflected above all in the fact that by the second half of the 1980s 
the FMC was reputedly the most unpopular mass organisation on the island, 
unable to hal t dec l in ing a t tendance at meet ings , address the growing 
dissatisfaction arising from a deteriorating economic performance, or, of 
course, the increasing desire of many Cubans, particularly the young, to flee 
the country by any means, legal or illegal. Despite the evident efforts to 
assimilate some of the debates about women's place in society and the 
resultant modernisation of its rhetoric and improved policies on some issues, 
the Federation had failed to achieve a strong political profile. For some 
analysts this was because it did not seek to mobilise around issues of a 
feminist or controversial kind and rarely contested official policy. Its main 
periodical, Mujeres, avoided difficult (ie interesting and relevant) questions, 
preferring 4to stick to recipes'.46 Certainly it was widely acknowledged to 
have failed to attract younger women into its ranks, and its own cadres 
responded by denouncing the increasingly depoliticised youth as morally 
bankrupt and frivolous. By the end of the decade it was seen as having lost 
momentum and there were again calls for it to be closed down.47 
This contradictory evolution was evident by the time of the Fifth FMC 
Congress, held in 1990. A random survey of 100 women taken a week before 
the Congress revealed a striking indifference to the FMC's activities. Seventy 
per cent of respondents did not know that the Congress was taking place, and 
only six had great hopes of its outcome. An ambitious agenda had been 
promulgated and discussed prior to the Congress itself; but at the Congress 
45 It cannot be excluded that at least part of the shift in Cuban policy was 
influenced by the growing discussion within the Soviet Union of how neglect of 
women's concerns was linked to rising social problems - marital instability, 
delinquency, absenteeism, crime. 
46 Azicri (1988). 
47 Bengelsdorf (1994). Padula and Smith (1996) note that some observers 
interpreted the removal of some leading FMC members at the Fourth Party 
Congress in 1991 from the Central Committee as an effort by the Party to 
distance itself from a dying institution. 
it was overruled by a more traditional stress on mobilising women in defence 
of the revolution (under the old patriotic slogan 'Socialism or Death') and 
was , as a consequence , never rea l i sed . 4 8 The Congress ended with a 
unanimous vote of confidence for Castro, described as 'the Father of all 
Cubans , and guide to all Cuban W o m e n ' . 4 9 In the words of one Lat in 
American feminist in Cuba for the preparatory regional meeting of the Cairo 
Population Conference: 'the atmosphere had changed, the old guard were 
back, the ones who were sympathetic to feminism seemed to have dis-
appeared'.50 
In the period that followed, the main determinant of women's position was 
not any shift in FMC attitudes to feminism, but the crisis which engulfed the 
whole Cuban regime and society as a result of events in eastern Europe. The 
collapse of communist party rule in the revolutions of 1989 and the end of the 
Soviet Union removed the economic support that had sustained Cuba for 
thirty years. The precipitate decline in the economy exposed the population 
to extremes of deprivation they had never dreamt of, and, while women 
struggled to cope as best they could, the FMC uttered not a word of protest 
about the policies pursued nor tried to place them in a gender perspective. 
Instead women were once again called upon to support the revolution by 
redoubling their efforts. Thousands entered the micro-brigades to build 
houses, or volunteered to work in the agricultural sector. 
4Emancipation' and Instrumentalism 
After more than three decades of socialist policies, the Cuban population as 
a whole had achieved greater access to health and education, and the poorest 
quintile had seen a marked improvement in their standard of living. With 
48 Stubbs (1994) notes: 'Discussion was stymied at the congress when the 
FMC leadership shifted from an exciting gender agenda to one of defence and 
production for reasons of national political expediency. Many women accepted 
the policy decision at the time, though with mixed feelings, but the grass-roots 
work was not lost' (p. 197). 
49 Smith and Padula (1996) note how those who dissented f rom this 
paternalism could be treated: 'In 1991, Maria Elena Cruz Varela, a 37 year old 
award winning poet, socialist and mother of two, publicly renounced Castro as 
'not my father' and protested in an open letter to the commander in chief the 
lack of democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba. In response a 'rapid 
reaction Brigade' dragged her from her Havana apartment, beat her and made 
her physically swallow some of her own writings' (p. 534). She was imprisoned 
for 18 months. 
50 Author's interview, 1996. 
regard to women, Cuban socialism had presided over their mobilisation into 
considerable activity at all levels of public life, but had imposed a heavy toll 
on daily life, one common to 'shortage economies', while the social division 
of labour remained unchanged in its essential features as far as the gender 
order was concerned. Thus the decades of communist rule, for all that they 
did bring changes in social relations, in only a limited way altered the balance 
of power between the sexes either in the home or in the public realm. 
The role played by the FMC in this process was in many ways a contradic-
tory one: it was an authoritarian organisation which took its orders from 
above and allowed little internal dissent, let alone public debate of policy 
issues. It was itself a pyramidal organisation whose senior members were 
never, any more than any other officials of the party or state elite, subject to 
a genuine electoral process. Its input into policy, even as a mild form of 
pressure group on behalf of women, was hampered by its primary allegiance 
to the party and by the latter 's control over budget allocation and overall 
policy. It had relatively few resources to undertake research on issues 
relating to women; the result was that even if it had wished to, it had limited 
means of arguing for or against policies on the basis of their popularity, 
effectiveness or likely impact on women's lives, beyond what its officials 
reported.51 
Yet the FMC was supposed to represent more than just a mouthpiece of the 
party, and it did provide a space, albeit one within determined limits, for 
activities and discussion around issues of gender and power. Any attempt to 
assess its significance is bound by larger considerations about the meaning of 
the revolution and the socialist project itself. For those who see the entry of 
women into the public sphere, their education and employment as a good in 
itself, the Federation clearly assisted in this role. For those who stress the 
negative terms of that involvement, placing the emphasis on the Federation's 
lack of autonomy and authoritarian character, the gains are diminished as an 
e f f e c t of i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t p o l i c i e s or the i n e v i t a b l e p r o c e s s e s of 
modernisation.52 
Within the prevailing political context there can be little doubt that the 
51 The fact that it was throughout this period, or at least until an apparent 
separation in 1982, run by the wife of Castro's brother Raul, the latter generally 
held to be the most intransigent member of the whole revolutionary leadership, 
did little to inspire confidence in the FMC's overall ability for initiative. This 
was all the more so since Raul Castro was himself a regular speech-maker at 
FMC congresses. 
52 For examples of these differing views see Dominguez (1977) and 
Bengelsdorf (1988). 
FMC played an important role in helping to realise government goals in 
relation to women. Women's emancipation constituted one of the ideological 
platforms of state communism, and the women's union had a legitimate role 
in promoting these principles. Its claims to have advanced the project of 
women's emancipation and hence to have improved the lot of its female 
citizens was an achievement of which the regime was particularly proud. It 
certainly made available abundant evidence of the benefits that Cuban women 
enjoyed under the patronage of the state, in terms of education, health and 
expanding employment opportunities. But there is another reading of this 
history of progress, one which is not captured by the statistics, and which 
p laces these gains in a more nega t ive l igh t . This is sugges ted by the 
experience of the former Soviet bloc in relation to 'the woman question', and 
may bear upon considerat ions of the prospects of the Cuban regime 's 
institutions and its own survival into the next period. 
Wi th regard to the Cuban record on ' w o m e n ' s emanc ipa t i on ' it is 
impossible to say whether popular attitudes will turn out to be significantly 
different from those that emerged in other parts of the post-communist world. 
Here there was considerable criticism of the nature of the official project of 
'emancipation' in general, its many shortcomings even in its own terms, and 
of the attempt to realise it through state intervention, from above, via state-
sponsored women's unions. Such a programme of emancipation, for all its 
undoubted social achievements, in the event redounded less to the credit of 
these reg imes than was supposed by many ana lys ts , especia l ly under 
condit ions perceived as dependent on an unacceptable concentrat ion of 
political power at the centre. 
The experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has shown 
how commitments of principle which are worthwhile in themselves, such as 
'the emancipation of women,' can come to be perceived as little more than 
meaningless slogans because of the manner in which the state may seek to 
realise them.53 As for the institutions which were designed to represent the 
interests of certain groups, such as the official women's organisations, these 
came to be seen as objects of derision, their staff as 'bureaucratic dinosaurs'. 
This was true even of those cases like former Yugoslavia where, in the 
aftermath of World War II, the women's organisation did, like the party, 
have considerable popular support. After 1989, these organisations, far from 
be ing dep loyed by , or being ava i lab le to , those most a f fec ted by the 
restructuring process to defend their interests, withered away, bereft of both 
popular support and state sponsorship. It is indeed striking in the post-
communist countries, where some organisations formerly associated with the 
53 For a discussion of the 'backlash' effect in the former Soviet bloc see 
Molyneux (1994) and Funk and Mueller (1993). 
communist state, such as the press or trades unions, did find a new political 
role, how small a role in the transit ion period was played by women 's 
organisations.54 Where effective advocacy by women's organisations did 
occur, this was undertaken by independent women's associations, ones often 
formed on a 'dissident' basis in the pre-collapse environment.55 Only later, 
as the former Party organisations acquired independence and new agendas, 
did some of them manage to revitalise themselves as genuine non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs). 
Ultimately, such judgements in the case of Cuba will have to wait until the 
emergence of an internal feminist critique, and until this is, in turn, put into 
perspective by history. It is often said by Cubans themselves that the FMC 
did play a useful role in the early period of the revolution and enjoyed 
support by virtue of its positive association with a popular revolution. The 
latter brought tangible benefits to many who had suffered under the previous 
system, and who now enjoyed a measure of upward mobility. As a women's 
organisation dedicated to sexual equality, it may even have benefited from 
Cuba's long and distinguished history of activism by women's movements,56 
although it chose to distance itself from that past, preferring to attribute to 
the revolution of 1959 the key role in women's history of struggle. Whatever 
its fai l ings, Cuban social ismhad created a distinctive kind of women's 
movement, albeit one which was a creature of the state. The FMC repre-
sented a sustained and in some ways a successful attempt to legitimate an 
institutionalised women's movement rather as populist regimes in Latin 
America had played an innovative role in shaping an institutionalised labour 
movement.57 The Cuban Communist Party sought to construct new gender-
state relations and the women 's movement it created was authorised to 
represent and pursue women's interests, officially defined. In a myriad of 
ways - by mobilising women, creating a female constituency, funding a 
women's organisation, and diffusing an official discourse of women's rights 
and sexual equality - the leadership effectively legitimated women's claims 
on the state and against certain structures of authority and discrimination. 
But, as has been written of Chinese Communist Party thinking, it is as if a 
bargain is struck: in return for policy initiatives supporting women, the state 
54 One potential exception is the political party Women of Russia which 
operated as a separate organisation winning 23 seats in the Duma elections of 
1993 and three in those of 1995. This was, however, in reality a grouping of 
communists, with little particular concern for women's issues, and after the 1995 
elections it more or less re-merged with the Communist Party. It was, amongst 
other things, vociferous in support of the war in Chechenia. 
55 See Rueschmeyer (1994). 
56 See Stoner (1991) for a history of women's rights activism in Cuba. 
57 Castaneda (1994). 
expected complete loyalty to the Party line and brooked no rivals.58 
The successes of the FMC were, therefore, limited by the very character 
of its organisational form. After the excitement of the first decade and despite 
some enlargement of its agenda, it became, as many observers indicated, 
increasingly ossified: along with other mass organisations it was criticised for 
its bureaucratic character, something which placed evident limits on its 
pretensions to act on behalf of its constituency. Much feminist criticism of 
the FMC and of the Cuban record with regard to its policies on women has 
focused on the resil ience of patriarchal privi lege, sexual inequali ty, 
machismo and of the social and gendered divisions of labour, with the 
implication that the women's union and the state could and should have 
devoted more efforts to 'transforming society'. While it is undoubtedly true 
that the organisat ion could have done more to address these issues, the 
problem may have been the reverse, namely that too much intervention 
occurred, that too much energy was expended in attempts to force a diverse 
population into conformity with the Party line. The FMC's lack of autonomy 
and its instrumentalism may have enhanced its effective capacity to bring 
about change in some areas, but it seems also to have generated some 
resistance to conformity. This resistance was evident in its declining support, 
in the falling proportion of women in most political institutions, and in young 
people's boredom with the old rhetoric, all of which may have symbolised a 
more general dissatisfaction and retreat from an increasingly exhausting 
public domain. 
The FMC in the 1990s 
The 1990s held out the prospects of even greater challenges to the FMC, on 
the one hand resulting from the failures of the policies of rectification to 
prevent the economic collapse of 1993-94, on the other from the policies 
adopted in response to the deepening crisis. If the effects of the former were 
predictable, and negative in human terms, those of the latter were more 
varied and threatened further to detach the FMC from its constituency. 
The consultative efforts prior to the 1990 Congress had led the FMC to 
deve lop what its o f f i c i a l s descr ibed as a somewhat more ' f e m i n i s t ' 
approach59 and to seek a more visible role among its constituency. These 
imperatives, however, came at a time when the demands placed both on the 
organisat ion and on its members were acknowledged to be part icularly 
58 Croll (1978). Also see Valdes (1992) on Cuban political culture and the 
particular significance of lealtad (loyalty). 
59 Interview with FMC official, Havana, January 1996. 
severe. The FMC had faced a difficult situation during the years of rectifica-
tion and the 'special per iod ' placed its dual function as a promoter of 
women ' s equality and arm of the party, under renewed strain. Partly in 
response to this new situation, the FMC renewed its attempts to re-fashion 
itself as an NGO, a status few were prepared to credit, given its ties to the 
Party and the regime, and one which it did little to confirm in its rhetoric.60 
The Sixth Congress in 1995 re-emphas ised the pr inc ipa l role of the 
organisation as 'defence of the revolution', while the General Secretary's 
speech once again invoked the heroic, militant, and nationalist past of Cuban 
women, p lac ing the federadas61 at F i d e l ' s r ight hand in res is t ing the 
imperialist blockade and defending the gains of the revolution. The re-
articulation of the themes of revolutionary nationalism, lealtad and identifica-
tion of the Party with Cuba's national history, together with the invocation 
of a militant Cuban womanhood, underscored the political character of the 
FMC in a frank re-statement of its priorities. 
The combination of economic crisis and restructuring policies nonetheless 
placed the FMC under pressure to justify its existence in somewhat different 
terms: to its existing functions it added renewed fundraising efforts in the 
international arena for its projects, ranging from healthcare delivery and 
social work to publishing programmes. Yet, while it claimed to defend the 
cause of sex equality through governmental and policy channels, it acted less 
as a vehicle for advancing women 's interests than as one which had to 
manage female discontent and mobilise increasing numbers o f f ederadas into 
voluntary work. On paper the organisation maintained and even increased its 
organisational strength. In 1994 over 3.5 million women paid their dues as 
a result of special efforts to increase membership and to collect the money on 
which the FMC depended for a substantial portion of its funds. In the same 
year it claimed representation in 72,874 delegaciones and 12,114 bloques; it 
had a paid staff of 1,327, and 242,008 voluntary leaders at the base of the 
organisation.62 
60 The Cuban Report in the Mujeres Latinoamericanas en Cifras series 
contains an insert from the FMC leadership criticising the authors for what it 
sees as errors and bias in the interpretation. Among the points made is the 
following: 'Queremos apuntar que resulta un error insertar a la FMC bajo el 
rubro de Accion Estatal, cuando se trata de un ONG'. Instituto de la Mujer/-
FLACSO (1992). It is worth noting that at the Fourth United Nations Conference 
on Women (Beijing, 1995) the FMC was represented at both the NGO forum 
(the only Cuban women's NGO) and at the governmental meeting. 
61 Federadas is the Cuban term denoting FMC membership. 
62 The percentage of adult women nominally affiliated to the FMC rose from 
74.0% in 1974 to 82.3% in 1994. In 1994 the total number of federadas was 
3,657,220, the largest percentage made up of housewives at 42.5 % and workers 
Despite these impressive figures, FMC activity at neighbourhood level was 
patchy, sometimes minimal, and as the CDRs declined in importance, so too 
did the FMC. In 1996 the FMC was widely regarded as ' irrelevant ' to the 
needs of Cuban women , and while some acknowledged that there were some 
good people working within it, 'the top layer is too rigid, everyone says that 
as an organisat ion it has to change ' . 6 3 It had therefore not succeeded in 
acquiring a more positive image in the eyes of the Cuban public, and it had 
not been helped in these efforts by the fact that for the previous two years, 
as a result of a paper shortage, it had been unable to publish its periodicals 
Mujeres and Muchachas. The general contraction of resources associated with 
the special period inevitably affected its overall organisational capacity as 
well as the morale of its supporters, be these its permanent staff on their 
dwindling real incomes or the large voluntary workforce o f f ederadas whose 
time was already under considerable pressure from the demands of surviving 
in increasingly difficult circumstances. 
From its own organisational perspective and from the vantage point of 
what were seen as the recovery years of 1995-6, it had not only survived the 
worst years, but it saw itself as well placed to play a key role in the changing 
policy environment. In early 1996 it was preparing to engage in an island-
wide 'consultation' process for feedback on the resolutions of the Sixth 
Congress and it had a l ready held a number o f , in its v iew, success fu l 
sessions. With the easing of the paper shortage, Mujeres and Muchachas were 
to be revived and a new periodical was planned for diffusion abroad, largely 
for fundraising purposes. While the FMC's magazines were to be aimed at 
a broader and younger readership, it was significant that editorial control of 
these was to remain in the hands of senior members of the FMC's revolution-
ary generation. 
The organisation also counted among its successes the Casas de Orienta-
tion de la Mujer y la Familia (also known as Casas de la Mujer, or Casas) 
an idea loosely based on the 'Women ' s Houses ' supported by women 's 
movements in Latin America and elsewhere which offered a variety of 
services as refuges from domestic violence and centres of advice and support. 
Fol lowing demands made at the previous Congress in 1990, it had also 
expanded the number of childcare centres to a total of 1,156. Its activity in 
the field of health was given prominence and a new project, assisted by UN 
funds, was underway in which the FMC organised voluntary healthworkers 
for an extensive screening for cervical cancer. 
at 38.9%. Students (10.5%), pensioners and others accounted for the rest. FMC 
(1995a). 
63 Author's interview with ex-FMC member. 
The mobilisation of women into voluntary work was an important aspect 
of the Federation's response to the crisis, continuing in some measure the 
policy of the rectification period. However, if voluntary programmes were 
important in themselves, and could provide the organisation with a civic role 
in the transition, they revealed some of the ambiguity of the FMC's dual 
function as a women's organisation and as an arm of the state. This was 
particularly evident in the FMC's social work programme, which involved 
some 53,000 volunteers. In keeping with its growing concern with what it 
saw as a crisis in the family it directed considerable energy and resources 
towards 'family support' initiatives, much of which aimed to help more than 
10,000 single mothers and 36,000 children in need. The FMC's volunteers 
helped in locating absconding fathers for purposes of legal recognition of 
children and support, and in arranging subsidies and care for abandoned or 
distressed children. 
Much of this work was channelled through the Casas de Orientation de la 
Mujer y la Familia, which by 1994 numbered 155 throughout the island. 
These Casas served as a vehicle for FMC initiatives at local level: as such 
they differed radically from those established by women's movements in 
other countries. They were, as their name suggested, designed principally to 
'guide' (orientar) women; they offered a drop-in social, psychological and 
legal advice service and organised a range of courses, some of which aimed 
to help women to acquire a trade and set up their own small businesses. In 
1996 the most important of these Casas, in the Municipio Plaza de la 
Revolution, located in Havana and serving a population of 171,000, offered 
courses in bicycle repair, sewing and hairdressing.64 
The offer of such services could potentially fulf i l a useful purpose. 
However, the manner in which they were delivered revealed the FMC's 
difficulties in meeting the needs of its constituency. In the first place the 
courses on offer were rather limited in scope and character, but they were 
also arranged to run for as long as six weeks to three months, with meetings 
twice, sometimes three times a week. This unnecessarily lengthy period of 
time, given the relatively low level of skill attainment involved, was required 
because the courses also included a s izeable element of pol i t ica l and 
ideological training (or ien ta t ion ) , suggesting that these courses were 
designed to funct ion more as recruitment channels for the FMC than as 
disinterested services for female citizens. 
This underlines the fundamental problem faced by the FMC in its role in 
providing social services. The offer by the Casa de la Mujer of free advice 
64 This information is based on a meeting with the Director, and member of 
the FMC for 25 years, and several staff, at this Casa. 
from social workers and legal experts again constituted, at face value, a 
useful resource for women; but because the FMC was perceived by its 
clientele as an arm of government its advice was not seen as disinterested, 
nor was it offered as such; nor, of course, could those visiting the Casa 
expect to find redress from the actions of the state itself. Those seeking help 
in handling difficult issues such as drug dealing and abuse in their family, a 
jinotera daughter , a suspected AIDS infect ion, an alcoholic or violent 
husband, or a son considering the option of becoming a balsero, knew that 
they would receive an off ic ia l response, one which exposed the person 
seeking advice to a political lecture, or worse, to the risk of involving the 
law, whether the person seeking advice wished it or not.65 The rates of take-
up among the population for the services on offer at the main Casa in Havana 
were strikingly low, with only 181 visits recorded for 1995. This indicates 
some reluctance on the part of women to avail themselves of these services, 
and it was not difficult to see why. 
The very multifunctionality of the FMC and its overall character thus 
prevented it from effectively serving the needs of its constituency in this type 
of work. As an organisation it has always suffered from overloading, and this 
continued because it felt itself unable to disperse its activities to non-state 
agencies. If the FMC were to play a useful role in the delivery of social 
welfare, it would have more success if it redefined its status, either acting as 
part of the welfare ministry, i.e. as an acknowledged and adequately funded 
department of the state, or acting as an autonomous body, a genuine NGO, 
along with others. In the present context, as the only permitted women's 
organisation, and encumbered by its function as a Party organisation, it has 
been inhibited from developing a serious response to the changes which Cuba 
faces in the future. This failing was widely criticised by former federadas. 
As one explained: 'The FMC not only lacks analysis, it also lacks a sense of 
its own purpose: this is why it is perceived as irrelevant by the mass of Cuban 
women whose lives have changed so dramatically.'66 
The Federation's public response to the new policies has been to play down 
their effects on women, and to join in the Party leadership's moralising 
stance in relat ion to those who were 'enchanted by capi ta l i sm' . It did, 
65 When I asked the Director of the Casa de la Mujer in Havana what advice 
a woman would be offered in the case of drug abuse or domestic violence she 
replied 'It's simple, it is a legal offence' (author's interview, January 1996). 
Such an approach does not encourage use of such services, let alone the capacity 
of individuals to deal with their problems. One official's response to my enquiry 
about violence against women was that 'the greatest violence is that of the 
blockade'. 
66 Author's interview, 1996. 
however, acknowledge the extra strains endured by women in the special 
period; Vilma Espin made a point of praising the efforts of Cuban women in 
her speech to the Sixth Congress. But, again, many of the most serious 
problems women faced - housing, poverty, job loss, not to mention sexual 
abuse, rape or rising violence against women resulting from the overall crisis 
- were ones which the organisation felt either unable to acknowledge publicly 
or refused to discuss except in familiar rhetorical terms. This resulted in part 
from the continuing role the FMC played in disseminating Party propaganda 
both at home and in the international arena. But in an epoch in which analysis 
rather than slogans were called for, it was able to offer little in that regard. 
Given these problems it is hardly surprising that the FMC was seen as 
unable to respond to the policies adopted to deal with the crisis. Yet its 
natural constituency had already come under the deepening pressures of the 
process of adjustment under way. The new policies created additional social 
and political tensions which the FMC showed little sign of responding to and 
which would, in all probabi l i ty , weaken still fur ther its claims on its 
constituency. 
The Costs of Adjustment 
Most discussion of the 'special period' has focused on Cuban economic 
performance, but there has been less discussion of the human costs of the 
adjustment process - let alone of the costs borne by women, whether actual 
or prospective. This is a general problem with the 'transition' literature - as 
numerous accounts have attested. Part of the difficulty is that the human cost 
of macro-economic policies is hard to measure with any precision, and 
requires longitudinal data to reveal its full effects. But information in Cuba's 
case is even more restricted, owing to deficiencies in data collection, and to 
the fact that certain data have not been made available to outside scrutiny. 
Cuban sources67 do, however, instance rising numbers of job losses, and for 
the worst years of the crisis (1991-94) declining health and living standards 
due to shortages of basic goods, the rise in the cost of living and the sharp 
contraction of supplies of energy and transport.68 
67 The fullest report is that produced by the National Institute for Economic 
Research (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Economicas, 1995). 
68 Great efforts have been made to protect the health of the population in the 
crisis, even in the context of acute shortages. Some measure of the human 
impact of shortage, and of government efforts to alleviate it can be gained from 
the data on infants: while the incidence of low birth weight rates rose from a low 
of 7.3% for 1989 to 9.0% in 1993 and 8.9% in 1994, infant mortality rates (i.e. 
deaths of infants under one year per 1,000 live births) continued to decline from 
Poverty is not acknowledged in official sources, but it has always existed 
in communist states , even if not at the levels of immiseration found in many 
third world market economies. Cuban figures for 1986 indicate that 33.8% 
of the population lived below the average income, while a CEPAL-FLACSO 
report of 1992 notes that since 1989 there had occurred 'a general impover-
ishment' of the population69 reflecting, among other things, unemployment, 
the erosion of savings and rising costs of living. Moreover, falls in real 
minimum wage levels impact upon social benefits. Pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits are normally pegged to the minimum wage, and consequently 
decline. There have been some tentative moves away from a universal system 
of benefit in the direction of targeting, and there has been a turn towards the 
introduction of user charges for some educational and other services. These 
include cultural and sporting activities, services in the education sector such 
as evening language classes, payment for school meals except for those on the 
lowest incomes, and even loans for higher education students' maintenance. 
This shift, in the words of one analyst, 'has ended an era for the revolution, 
bringing market relations back into spheres from which they had long since 
been banished'.70 While efforts are made to develop policies which conform 
to the principle of 'adjustment with equity', and measures have been taken to 
target those in need through a variety of social programmes (family doctors, 
'nutritional vigilance' campaigns), the task confronting the government with 
respect to poverty alleviation is a formidable one. 
The existing difficulties are likely to intensify with the effects of increasing 
job insecurity as the labour market drifts away from protected, full-time jobs 
towards marginal, often undeclared, or irregular jobs, and towards higher 
rates of unemployment. Poverty is likely to worsen among the groups which 
constituted the majority of the poor in the previous epoch, among them 
women and Afrocubans,71 but if trends elsewhere are replicated, Cuba will 
face an emerging category of 'new poor' - young people in search of their 
first jobs, low skilled workers, older women, and the new unemployed. Some 
rural areas are vulnerable to poverty, as are regions where dependency on 
under-performing state industries has generated high employment. 
Poverty is less a product of growing social inequality than of fal l ing 
10.7 in 1991 to 9.9 in 1994. Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (1995). 
69 Instituto de la Mujer/FLACSO (1992). 
70 Morris (1994). 
71 Official data are beginning to reflect an awareness of the situation of 
Afrocubans. The INIE Report (1995) for instance contains data showing that the 
lowest wages are paid in regions where the concentration of Afrocubans is 
greatest. 
income levels. Growing social inequality was an anticipated consequence of 
the move to the market, one which the Castro leadership attempted to curb 
in 1986, but Cuba is now braced for a growing polarisation of incomes as the 
r e fo rms ra ise the incomes of resource holders and widen the unequal 
distribution of wealth.72 Yet, while shifts in this direction are confirmed by 
the evidence, inequalities have grown more slowly than might be expected, 
dependent as they are on the pace and character of the restructuring process 
itself, on employment levels and social expenditure programmes. 
The new policies adopted in Cuba involve the (as yet limited) liberalisation 
of the economy and include the legalisation of the use of dollars and of self-
employment,73 the devolution of state farms to workers' co-operatives, the 
re-legalisation of farmers' markets in 1994, the further expansion of tourism, 
selective foreign investment (largely through joint ventures) and most 
recently tax reform. 
The effects of the adjustment so far have been cushioned by the mainten-
ance of extensive commitments to the social sector and to the social wage in 
the form of free healthcare and education such that a safety net, if precarious, 
was still in place. At the National Assembly in May 1994 there had been 4an 
explicit rejection of the monetarist, neo-liberal approach' with stabilisation 
seen as a political and social problem, not a 'technocratic' one.74 Social 
security spending had risen by 33% from 1989-93, partly to cover unemploy-
ment benefits, and while it has fallen since then, efforts were made to protect 
social expenditure in the 1996 budget. Many government welfare services, 
including childcare centres, were still functioning in 1996, although with 
considerably reduced capacity.75 However, despite the serious efforts which 
had been made to protect the health and education sectors from attrition and 
cuts, both were badly affected by shortages, only partially alleviated when 
international relief was obtained. It is only a matter of time before social 
sector reform is introduced, if only to reduce inefficiencies and achieve better 
72 The great socio-economic divide in Cuba in 1996 is between those who 
have regular access to US dollars and those who do not. But there is also 
significant social inequality in relation to housing which in turn permits some to 
maximise their advantage by letting out rooms, or establishing profitable 
paladares. More than 70% of the Cuban population have entitlements to their 
dwellings, but these are highly variable in size and quality. 
73 These measures were passed in 1993. 
74 Morris (1994). 
75 With respect to childcare, a private sector has been allowed to develop 
under FMC supervision. Smith and Padula (1996) report that by 1991 in the 
municipality of Matanzas 156 women were caring for some 2,000 children in 
their homes. 
targeting in order to reach those most in need. Moreover, given Cuba's 
economic prospects, it is unlikely that the extensive commitment to social 
welfare can continue at anything approximating present levels. Further 
adjustment and stabilisation measures are inevitable, and even if the govern-
ment succeeds in cushioning their effects to some degree, a substantial 
proportion of the population is threatened with growing insecurity. The 
prospects for the FMC's constituency is therefore bleak, at least until the 
reforms take their effect; adjustment has a distinctly gendered character, and 
as its record shows elsewhere, it tends to exacerbate social divisions and 
gender inequalities. 
The economic policies which have been put in place in Cuba to date 
involve four related elements, each of which, as we shall see, has particular 
gender implications: reductions in public sector employment; the adoption of 
a selective programme of foreign investment favouring the expansion of 
tour ism; control led growth of petty trade; and tight fiscal and demand 
restraint. To these the FMC's response has been muted, although having 
participated in the many regional and international conferences on public 
policy - including, most recently, that which took place in Beijing in 1995 -
its upper echelons at least are well versed in the debate on the gendered 
effects of adjustment. 
Analyses of the social effects of adjustment from a gender perspective have 
indicated that women have tended to bear the brunt of macro-economic policy 
changes for three reasons: they consti tute a greater proport ion of the 
vulnerable groups - the elderly and infirm, single parent households, and low 
paid workers; their employment is most likely to be threatened; and their 
domestic and caring responsibi l i t ies tend to expand, exposing them to 
increased workloads as they attempt to survive in conditions of scarcity, cuts 
in public welfare and declining standards of living. 
Cuba's process of restructuring was, in early 1996, still in its initial stages 
and the measures adopted had so far been of a partial, tentative character. 
The entry of private capital, mainly in the form of joint ventures, had not 
been accompanied by large scale sell-offs and privatisation, something which 
has been criticised both in Cuba and beyond for delaying Cuban prospects of 
recovery.76 Yet the severity of the balance of payments crisis in 1991-93 
brought many factories to a standstill for lack of inputs and, while some have 
resumed production, many are still closed or on part-time schedules. On 
some calculations, 50% of existing enterprises may be destined for permanent 
closure.77 
76 See interviews in NACLA (1995), and Pastor (1995). 
77 Author's interviews with Cuban economists, 1996. 
The pressure on the social sector comes at a time when the policy commit-
ment in favour of full employment has also been revised. The government has 
announced its intention of reducing employment by half a million, and this 
is expected to rise to a million over the course of 1996-7. Guaranteed, full-
time employment has been a main plank in the centrally planned economies' 
(CPEs) system of entitlements, and the ending of this policy represents a 
radical break with the past as far as Cuban citizens are concerned. The 
commitment to high levels of employment not only aimed to guarantee a full-
time job for life, but also represented a plank in the universal system of social 
security, in which work and the workplace itself formed the basis of a range 
of entitlements to healthcare, subsidised food, scarce commodities, childcare 
and sometimes even holidays. Employment was, in both ideological and 
practical terms, the basis of membership in the socialist community.78 
As noted above, one of the ways in which programmes of adjustment take 
effect, and with particular impact on women, is through reducing the wage 
bill, i.e. through cuts in employment. Until 1994 Cuba was able to maintain 
high levels of employment, and even sustained rises in some areas such as in 
the health sector79 and in the sectors undergoing expansion, through joint 
ventures with foreign investment - notably in tourism. The FMC has painted 
an optimist ic picture of the situation of female workers in the 'special 
period', arguing on the basis of 1994 data that there had occurred no decline 
in female participation rates. A full 44% of Cuban women were in employ-
ment in 1993, constituting a female labour force of 3,203,904. One FMC 
study argued that, far f rom women 's participation fal l ing, in the areas 
designated 'priority sectors' (tourism, agroscienceand technology andhealth) 
women represented 'a respectable force'. Overall, while men's employment 
in the civilian state sector declined from 62.5 % of the total in 1985 to 59.3 % 
in 1994, women's employment rose from 37.5% to 40.6%. The authors were 
able to conc lude that 'Cuban women have become a vital force in the 
country's economy, . . . ' they have been and continue to be 'a vital factor in 
development'.80 This, if sustained, could cushion other more negative trends 
which affect women's employment adversely, but it still avoids the problem 
of the future role of women in the economy and takes little account of how 
employment is defined. Bengelsdorf, for example, notes that many women 
78 Initially workers in non-functioning enterprises continued to receive their 
wages, but this was followed by the institution of unemployment benefits, 
amounting to 60% of previous pay for three months. Industrial redundancies 
were also dealt with through attrition, early retirement and where possible, 
relocation. 
79 The expansion of employment in healthcare has been steep since 1975, 
with a notable rise in the period 1985-94. 
80 Aguilar et al. (1994). 
have taken extended ' leaves' from work to devote themselves to the daily 
tasks of survival for their families.81 
Women's work, generally lower paid and less skilled, tends to be concen-
t r a t e d in a reas of e m p l o y m e n t w h i c h are t a r g e t e d f o r c l o s u r e or 
rationalisation - in Cuba's case in the 'traditional' sectors of the economy 
such as food production and in white collar work.82 Social attitudes also play 
their part, and, as experience elsewhere has shown, there occurs a growth in 
discrimination against women workers on the grounds that enterprises can no 
longer afford to bear the burden of the 'social costs' - costs arising from 
parenting responsibilities and entitlements. 
There is no available breakdown of job loss by sex in Cuba, but there is 
visible evidence of female unemployment in Havana; in early 1996 more than 
one stal lholder in the craft market in Vedado was a young woman pro-
fessional either out of work or unable to manage on what she earned; one 
nurse was supplementing her wage which she could no longer live on; 
another 23 year-old engineer reported that she had been sacked from her job. 
Those who are made redundant are given up to three offers of alternatives, 
but these need not be commensurate with their skills or former remuneration. 
Half a dozen women interviewed in Havana complained that they had been 
sacked and then offered inappropriate or distant alternatives, which they 
declined - usually for family reasons. Young professionals expressed 
cons ide rab le d i sconten t at a s i tua t ion where they could not f ind j obs 
commensurate with their skills and expectations. Significantly, the FMC was 
not seen as able to offer any solution or valuable advice to these women, 
beyond referring them to voluntary work and putting them on a register, a 
process which they regarded with scepticism and few seemed willing to try. 
It is clear that under such circumstances the state cannot be looked to, as 
in the past , to provide the solut ion, either to unemployment or to the 
declining standards of living which many have either already faced or will do 
in the near future. Other means of support and of satisfying expectations of 
social mobility have had to be found: chief among these ranks the opportun-
ities afforded by the expansion of the informal sector and petty trade. The 
legalisation of the dollar and of petty trade provided the central support for 
much of the population in 1995-6, and this permitted some tolerance of the 
decline in the state's capacity to provide. 
The re-opening of markets and the legalisation of certain categories of self-
employment has led to a burgeoning of entrepreneurial activity in the main 
81 Bengelsdorf (1995). 
82 Safa (1993). 
urban centres. By January 1996 there were more than 160,000 people 
registered as self-employed, and markets of various kinds were doing a brisk 
trade in agricultural produce, meat and crafts. Small shops selling snacks and 
drinks had also appeared outside people's houses, mostly run by women, as 
were the ubiquitous paladares, officially permitted so long as they do not 
exceed 12 dining places. Highly variable in quality and setting, these small 
restaurants can be successful both in attracting local peso customers for 
snacks and take-away pizzas, and, if the venue is attractive enough, well-
situated, and the food well-cooked, they can make a respectable dollar 
income from tourists. 
Informal sector activity of various kinds has a longer history in post-
revolutionary Cuba than the 'special period'.8 3 The need to legalise petty 
trade was acknowledged in the first half of the 1980s but this trade was closed 
down again in 1985. However, in the mid-1990s it had expanded, according 
to some estimates, to account for as much as half of the value of output.84 
In a trend that is comparable to what occurred in some eastern European 
CPEs,8 5 it has, since 1990, become an accepted part of survival, and in 
Cuba has acquired a more self-confident character. The harsh conditions of 
1991-94 turned the populat ion into one that survived by ' inventando' 
(inventing), with everyone understood to need extra resources.86 The official 
line on these activities remains ambivalent.87 Castro has himself attacked 
'those who get rich at the expense of others', while the FMC cadres worried 
about the 'social consequences' of such trade, and considered that those who 
engaged in it should not enjoy the social wage others had worked so hard to 
provide. Despite its seemingly greater tolerance, the CCP has evidently not 
shaken off its socialist prejudices about petty capitalism,88 although as in the 
83 A hairdresser in a quiet street in Vedado has been working from home for 
fifteen years. She has a large clientele and survived the worst periods of shortage 
by obtaining her equipment and supplies from abroad via relatives. The daughter 
of a salon owner in downtown Havana at the time of the revolution, her dream 
as she grew up was to follow her mother's path and open her own shop. 
84 Mesa Lago, quoted in Morris (1994). 
85 For a discussion of the role of the informal sector in Hungary see Szalai 
(1994). 
86 Author's interviews, January 1996. 
87 There are negative effects of the informal economy especially in CPEs 
because of the illegal diversion of resources including labour, from the formal 
economy; there are also greater opportunities and incentives for corruption. 
88 There are striking parallels between Cuban official attitudes to markets 
and those of the FSLN when in power in Nicaragua. The latter succeeded in 
alienating a substantial number of its supporters, many women traders, because 
case of Hungary under Kadar it seems to recognise how vital it is to the 
survival of its population in conditions of declining welfare. 
A less benign aspect of the expansion in informal sector activity is the 
growth of prostitution. This became a strategy for many women in the tourist 
areas of the island with the onset of the crisis. While illegal under the terms 
of the Criminal Code, it is officially tolerated as 'the social price we pay for 
development'89 and subject to some regulation by the authorities for reasons 
of public health. For the women involved, it represents not only a means of 
obtaining dollars, but for some, the hope that it will provide a husband and 
a life abroad. For the older revolutionary generation prostitution represents 
a re turn to a shameful past and the unsound atti tudes of ' the youth ' are 
routinely invoked to explain it. Yet for many habaneros, men and women, 
while it is certainly regretted, it is seen as resulting from economic necessity, 
thus ga in ing a degree of taci t suppor t f r o m fami ly members who are 
themselves dependent on the income generated. Some FMC functionaries do 
acknowledge the complexity of the issue of prostitution, but ultimately it is 
explained as an inevitable effect of the blockade and consequent economic 
difficulties faced by Cuba. At the same time, they deplore the practice, 
insisting that many jinoteras were not pushed into it by poverty but by bad 
attitudes and sometimes greed, and they lobbied the government at the end of 
1995 to pass legislation banning sex workers from hotels. They also made 
representation to hoteliers 'explaining to them why this had to be'.90 While 
this may reassure the promoters of family tourism in Cuba, it did little to 
address the problems of prostitution - let alone of the women engaged in 
it.91 Social analyses of tourism have suggested that it tends to excite local 
appetites for scarce foreign consumer goods through demonstration effects, 
but this is unlikely to be the sole reason for such an appetite in Cuba, given 
the shortage of even basic items that much of the population has endured. 
The mixed results of these various government policies notwithstanding, 
there was ev idence in ear ly 1996 of some improvement in the overa l l 
economic situation as well as at the household level, but there could be little 
of policies designed to bring market activities under state control. Chamorro 
(1995). 
89 Carlos Lage, in 1993, quoted in Bengelsdorf (1995). Castro too is 
reported to have said that women who prostitute themselves 'do so on their own, 
voluntarily and without any need for it'. Same source. 
90 Interview with senior members of the FMC, January 1996 
91 Apart from its other costs, prostitution represents a de-skilling of a highly 
trained and educated female population, especially since the evidence is that in 
the worst phase of the recession qualified professionals engaged in it along with 
other groups. 
doubt that this was taking place in a context of considerable hardship and 
insecurity. While the social wage and the safety net provided some protec-
tion, the removal of subsidies on most basic commodities hit those on the 
lowest incomes hardest since these expenditures form a larger proportion of 
their consumption. 
With social sector expenditure destined for cuts, if only on grounds of 
greater efficiency, in the medium-term the difficulty that has to be faced lies 
in preventing the emergence of a situation of general insecurity in a context 
where old (i.e. state) supports are being withdrawn, but new mechanisms of 
support are not yet functioning well enough to absorb the new demand. The 
informal sector and the possibility of establishing micro-enterprises certainly 
constitute a vital means of support for populations hit by declining state 
provision, but there are two other supports which have been key to survival 
in such contexts: the family or household, viewed as a network of kin 
support , and NGOs. We will return to the issue of NGOs later, but the 
question of the significance of the household in the transition process is one 
which condenses a number of central questions regarding women's place, 
both present and future, in Cuban society. 
The Household 
The direction of the process in train in Cuba signifies changes in the relation-
ship between state and society, changes which are premised on a redefinition 
of the boundaries between the public and private realms. This is a shift which 
has major gender implications. Households are typically seen as important 
supports in times of restructuring, and are assumed to be capable of adapting 
to the e f f ec t s of economic shor tage by res t r ic t ing consumpt ion . Barr 
expresses this view succinctly: 'Households adjust most quickly. They react 
swiftly to price increases, and adjust work effort in the light of changes in 
real wages and the emergence of unemployment.'92 But as has been repeat-
edly emphasised in the gender literature, 'households' need disaggregating. 
They are not natural units, but are constituted through social relations which 
are premised on considerable inequalit ies. It is, therefore, not so much 
'households ' that have to adapt as the individuals within them, and the 
implications for individuals of the process of adaptation vary according to 
their place in the division of labour both in the household and outside it. 
Since much of the increased effort expended to absorb the effects of the 
transi t ion is in the form of reproductive labour,9 3 it tends to be women 
92 Barr (1994). 
93 See Pearson (1996) for an analysis of Cuba's 'crisis in reproduction' 
whose invisible and unpaid labour on behalf of the household expands to 
enable its members to escape des t i t u t i on . The s t ra ins on househo lds 
attempting to survive in a context of great scarcity and rising costs involve 
cuts in consumption and an extension of work in the home to substitute for 
goods or services previously purchased on the market or made available 
through social provision. With regard to consumption, evidence from similar 
contexts elsewhere9 4 shows that it is women who tend to restrict their 
consumption more than men, including consumption of subsistence goods, 
while men's expenditure on non-essentials remains to some degree protected. 
Women also bear the greater burden of work in the home. Cuban surveys 
show that ' the tradit ional sexual division of labour in domestic w o r k ' , 
remains virtually unchallenged by years of FMC efforts to raise awareness 
of the problem, or by the 1975 Family Code, with 'women bearing the main 
burden, whether or not they are in employment' .9 5 It is women who also 
h a v e the ma in r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n ' s e d u c a t i o n and 
social isat ion,9 6 again something which the FMC has expressed concern 
about in campaigning for more responsible paternity. In periods of scarcity 
and adjustment, women's responsibilities for reproductive work involve an 
extension of their work time in the home. Most common of the adjustments 
made is that more food is prepared at home than bought ready-made, as 
'convenience foods' are too expensive to buy, while services of various kinds 
(cleaning, childcare, laundry and gardening) that might previously have been 
paid for, are absorbed by the female kin of the household.97 Under normal 
conditions, as we have noted, domestic provisioning in socialist states already 
94 See Folbre (1986) and Dwyer and Bruce (1988) for a comprehensive 
discussion of the evidence on this issue. 
95 Alvarez and Catasus, in FMC (1994). There are considerable disparities 
in the available data on social indicators of all kinds. Data for this section have 
been taken where possible from sources originating from the Centro de Estudios 
Demograficos at the Universidad de La Habana, and from INIE (1995). 
96 The father's role is described as 'poco activo que se relaciona menos con 
sus hijos y delega gran parte de su responsabilidad paterna en la companera'. 
Alvarez and Catasus (1994), p. 7. Meanwhile 'entre los hombres el mayor 
tiempo se invierte en "otras tareas y compras" aunque el tiempo dedicado a 
compras en ambos sexos es similar'. Ibid. 
97 This had, in effect, occurred in the household where I was staying in 
Vedado, Havana. The wife had given up her job because it was too far away and 
underpaid, and because she was looking after a sick relative. She still had a 
cleaner who came every day (informal domestic service is widespread in Cuba), 
but now did the gardening herself and spent a considerable amount of her time 
in household activities, shopping, and in negotiating for scarce resources and 
services. 
imposed a heavy toll on women due to shortages and lack of services. While 
the return of the farmers' markets in Cuba has brought prices down and has 
made more products available, prices are still high and time has to be spent 
hunting out bargains and products which are still scarce. 
Household management is not just a matter of increasing the amount of 
time expended on substituting women's labour for what was previously 
purchased on the market; as numerous studies attest, it is generally also 
women who are involved in negotiating exchanges of goods and services and 
short term loans through local networks and kin ties. The ability to obtain 
certain basic necessities often depends upon developing such networks, and 
can constitute an important lifeline. In other words, given this social and 
gendered distribution of responsibilities, it cannot be assumed that households 
are either labour pooling or income sharing units if this is meant to imply 
symmetrical relations between the sexes. 
The intensification of women's work and responsibilities also extends 
beyond household provisioning to absorbing greater responsibility for caring 
for others. The declining quality and accessibility of public services involves 
a shift to unpaid services in the household. Restructuring thus creates a 
redefinition of the boundaries between the public and private realms with 
greater responsibility being devolved from state to family. In a context where 
the availability of good quality childcare is threatened, and one where there 
is a growing population of elderly whose overall security is diminishing, 
female kin will in all likelihood be seen as those who will step in to fill the 
gaps in public provision. The granting of special leave to women workers for 
'family reasons' is one indicator that this is already occurring; it is their 
earnings and career patterns that are on the line and will be affected in the 
short as well as in the longer run by such practices. It is evident that even the 
limited restructuring that has taken place had already involved a re-negoti-
ation of reproductive responsibilities, and an absorption into the private 
sphere of some which were previously administered by the state. This has 
placed particular pressures on employed women with children. As the pace, 
demands and discipline of paid employment have risen, as in the restructured 
enterprises,98 so too have women's responsibilities in the domestic sphere. 
Data from other contexts of restructuring show high levels of stress and 
mental illness among working women. These issues are given little consider-
ation in the current context: indeed it is the absence of public debate and 
public policy on these issues which is striking. 
The record of adjustment processes in a wide variety of contexts indicates 
98 See Gunn (1993) for an account of the effects of enterprise restructuring. 
In one Cuban-owned plant, for example, discipline over the workforce was 
considerably tightened resulting in a 'doubling of efficiency'. 
that the assumption that families or households (i.e.women) can absorb the 
burden of adjustment is therefore doubly misplaced - first, because this 
burden is imposing considerable costs on those who bear it disproportion-
ately, and second, because these units are themselves likely to be at their 
limit. The effects of these multiple pressures are ultimately reflected in data 
on morbidity and mortality rates, but they are also sometimes revealed in 
patterns of household formation and reproductive behaviour." It may be too 
early for the effects of restructuring to have registered in Cuban data, and in 
any event, without more detailed, micro-level and qualitative research no 
conclusions can be drawn either as to the weight of the many factors involved 
in changing patterns of household composition, or as to the specificity of the 
Cuban case. What is pertinent to note is that Cuban sources for the last few 
decades have revealed significant changes in family size and composition. 
Most notable among these are the continuing fall in family size, rising 
incidence of female-headed households and rising divorce rates.100 
In the latter case there has been a particularly steep rise. The crude divorce 
rate rose from 0.6 (per thousand inhabitants) in 1961 to 3.6 in 1989. It rose 
again between 1989 and 1991 to reach 4.1, and by 1993 it was 6.0, one of the 
highest divorce rates in the world.101 If separations are taken into account 
the number of failed unions is considerably higher. Following international 
t r ends , a subs tan t ia l ma jo r i t y of those suing for d ivorce are women , 
something which the FMC sees as a sign of women 's greater economic 
independence. However true this might be, studies of divorce reveal women 
to be less well off economically than before, so there is a considerable price 
to be paid for such independence.1 0 2 Whether high divorce rates can be 
interpreted as a sign of the stress on households is a matter for fur ther 
research. In Cuba's case it must be remembered that the practicalities of 
divorce, in a context where housing stock is limited and where mutual 
dependency for survival is high, might otherwise discourage separation. 
These negative trends find confirmation in the steady decline in the Cuban 
fertility rate to well below replacement level, from an already low 1.8 in 
99 A UNICEF study of the former communist states shows that in all 
countries except Poland and former Czechoslovakia, there has occurred a net 
natural decrease in population. All countries show rising morbidity and death 
rates, and falling marriage and birth rates. UNICEF (1993). 
100 Demographic data also reveal a puzzling inverse sex ratio, at variance 
with the demographic norm: instead of being the majority, the female population 
constituted only 49.8% compared to 50.2% male in 1995. There is no adequate 
explanation of this. 
101 Alvarez and Catasus, in FMC (1994). 
102 Weitzman (1985) shows that while women are typically worse off after 
divorce, men's economic situation often improves. 
1985 to 1.6 in 1991, to 1.3 in both 1993 and 1994, the latter a year in which 
only 147,265 live births were recorded in the island. This syndrome, evident 
in all the CPEs, has been termed a 'mothers' strike' by some analysts in 
recognition of the strains that the female population of reproductive age faces 
in such systems. Some Cuban social scientists have suggested that both the 
high divorce rate and low birth rates over the last decade are indicative of a 
lack of confidence within the population resulting from the crisis which Cuba 
has faced since the late 1980s.1 0 3 Demograph ic t rends in Cuba raise 
interesting questions of comparability, showing parallels with Latin American 
and Caribbean data on the one hand, and with the former communist states 
on the other. This is an issue that awaits further exploration. 
Despite normative policy assumptions which favour nuclear families, these 
account for less than half of all households in Cuba, and, as elsewhere, 
households are diverse in composition and income levels. With most married 
women in work, the two-income household is still commonplace, but 
alongside it there has emerged a growing proportion of divorced or widowed 
single person and single parent households, the majority of which are female-
headed and constitute a rapidly growing high risk poverty clientele. One 
dramatic, if unacknowledged and peculiarly Cuban aspect of this gender 
burden relates to migration: in both the Mariel exodus of 1980 and in the 
flow of balseros of the early 1990s, the overwhelming majority of those who 
fled were men. Women were left behind to cope with family and other 
responsibilities, at best receiving dollar remittances but otherwise cut off 
from their male kin, at worst either abandoned or not knowing even if the 
men had survived the voyage to the USA.104 
Women are typically over-represented among the poor, and it is unlikely 
that Cuba will be able to avoid the feminisation of poverty evident in all the 
countries undergoing economic restructuring. Studies of Eastern European 
transitions have found that much of the burden of poverty falls on women, 
who, in the words of one analyst 'heavily outnumber men in groups which 
experience disproportionate poverty',105 with female poverty rates rising 
faster than female unemployment, even in conditions where the welfare state 
has not been entirely dismantled. The conditions for most women in poverty 
tend to deteriorate as a result of the restructuring process. We have already 
noted that women's wages are lower than men's and, in Cuba as elsewhere, 
103 Author's interviews, January 1996. 
104 A graphic example of this problem was the case of a former woman 
health operative, now working as a butcher in a market, who approached me 
with a request to post letters and photographs of her new baby to her balsero 
husband in the USA: she had not heard anything from him for three months. 
105 Barr (1994). 
women form the major i ty of the poorly paid. With regard to pensions, 
women ' s earnings are also less, since women 's working lives, with a 
retirement age of 55, are on average five years shorter than men's. More-
over , women ' s dependency on state benefi ts is overall greater not only 
because they live longer , but because they are of ten the sole providers 
because of the death or departure of their spouse, and they consti tute a 
sizeable proportion of the handicapped; thus, as state benefits contract, their 
vulnerability to poverty increases. 
These are some of the ways in which gender assymetries have acquired a 
new salience in the multiple processes of economic and social restructuring 
under way in Cuba. At the broadest level this novelty is given by the gradual 
re-definition of state-society relations which has begun to create new social 
divisions, new economic agents and new vulnerabilities for much of the 
female population. The processes set in train in the move towards marketisat-
ion have contradictory effects on women, acting to the detriment of many of 
those in employment and especially those who constitute the working poor, 
but providing others with the means to become new economic agents. It will 
be some time before the longer term trends are more clearly visible, but in 
the meantime the issue is whether the significance of these gender assym-
etries has been absorbed into public policy arenas, and responded to with 
appropriate policies, ones which succeed in reaching the most vulnerable 
groups. The FMC has so far shown that it is unlikely to offer an adequate 
response to these processes: as a government organisation its capacity to 
operate as an effective advocate of particular group interests is severely 
constrained and as we shall see, its work is not supported by other, indepen-
dent, NGOs. Moreover, the very growth of market relations that is under 
way is establishing a system of reward different to the previous bureaucratic 
and s tate channe ls which have d imin i shed incent ives to j o i n o f f i c i a l 
organisations. The FMC has shown itself so far to be unwilling to include 
these new economic agents in its project, and runs the risk of paying a further 
political price for its failure to do so. 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
If the FMC's ability to respond to the crisis was limited, as was that of the 
household with its declining capacity to absorb the tensions and pressures 
generated by the restructuring process, the other source of possible support 
for women lay in the expanding domain of the new NGO sector in Cuba. In 
other contexts NGOs have of ten provided a vital means of support and 
activism through specific women's projects, and in Cuba it is clear that 
NGOs could perform an equally important and necessary role in this regard. 
NGO activity was slow to develop in Cuba, but after 1990 it began to 
acqui re some momentum, a p r o d u c t born both of re formis t e f fo r t s to 
modernise the system, but also of sheer necessity, as a way to generate funds 
to support the welfare and other needs of the population. In 1993 a 'Meeting 
of Co-operation with Cuba' was held in Havana at which over 100 interna-
t i ona l NGOs were r e p r e s e n t e d t o g e t h e r wi th more than 70 Cuban 
organisations.106 Some sources claim that by 1995 there were around two 
thousand organisations which would be designated NGOs in Cuba.107 
While this is seen as positive in both social and political terms, indicating 
that the state has ceded some control over areas of social l i fe, this is a 
development that should be treated with caution, insofar as in Cuba, in 
common with many other third world countries, many supposedly indepen-
dent NGOs are, in fact, offshoots of the state, set up to attract foreign funds 
or act as conductors for state policy. But some of the NGO activity in Cuba 
is not of th is k ind : s ince the cr is is years of 1991-94 some genuinely 
independent NGOs, subsidiaries of groups from Canada, Mexico, Spain and 
elsewhere, have been granted permission to work, while a number of 
indigenous Cuban groups, some active at community level and working with 
the system of Popula r Power , have also been able to develop in new 
directions, and with more imaginative strategies. Some have also begun to 
address i ssues , such as the env i ronment , and cons t i tuencies such as 
AfroCubans, which were previously given little official recognition.108 In 
some cases ex is t ing mass o rgan isa t ions (act ing as NGOs) such as the 
institutions of poderpopular have acquired a new vitality in this process, 
working on projects with international organisations which have new ideas 
and different experiences to share.109 
With regard to women's NGOs there had been little progress by 1996 in 
that the FMC continued to monopolise the realm of activities in which NGOs 
are normally involved, and sought where possible to maintain control over 
106 Pearson and Lewis (1995). 
107 Puerta (1995). 
108 The Martin Luther King Centre focuses on Afrocubans with an agenda 
which prioritises issues of culture and development. There are a number of 
environmental NGOs, including the Naturaleza y El Hombre (sic). See Pearson 
and Lewis (1995) for a useful discussion of the role of NGOs in Cuba and for 
the need to have realistic expectations of their role in the transitional process. 
109 Author 's interviews with managers of projects in the NGO sector, 
January 1996. 
funds and resources which were directed to women 's projects.1 1 0 This 
concentration of power once again threatened to act as a brake on the capacity 
of the system to respond to the needs of its female population, for given the 
heterogeneity of the female population, and the diversity of problems and 
conditions it faced, no one organisation could adequately meet the challenge. 
The FMC was, in 1996, still the only women's organisation legally permitted 
on the island and, particularly pertinent here, it was still the only NGO 
licensed to deal specifically with women's issues. NGO activists who wanted 
to work with women tended to do so as a part of larger non-specific projects; 
one woman said 'we avoid the FMC, it is better to work without them. They 
are still stuck in old ways of 'macro-thinking' , they need a new perspect-
ive'.1 1 1 This situation brings to mind the tensions which existed in Nica-
ragua between the FSLN' s organisat ion of women, AMNLAE, and the 
independent activities and women's movements which mushroomed after the 
UNO victory in 1990.112 As far as many women activists and NGO workers 
were concerned, AMNLAE was a problem; it was perceived as rivalrous and 
uncooperative, and unwilling to accept principles of autonomy, internal 
democracy and commi tment to an apprec ia t ion of the d ivers i ty that 
characterised its const i tuency, issues that had acquired considerable 
importance in the Nicaraguan context. These very principles had enabled the 
independent organisations to develop a new vitality and momentum even in 
the difficult circumstances of adjustment and economic crisis in the early 
1990s.113 In time, AMNLAE, too, had to adapt by abandoning its earlier 
pretensions to 'hegemonise' the women's movement, and as a result became 
a more effective organisation. The FMC would do well to learn from this 
experience if it is to have a future as an organisation in Cuba, and if women 
are to get what they need in terms of a more diverse and more independent 
set of supportive institutions. 
110 For example, the environmental group, Green Team, had been training 
FMC staff to administer a project designed to stimulate urban gardening. Given 
the overloading most women are subject to, it is doubly problematic that the 
FMC was given responsibility for this project, one which would once again call 
for the mobilisation of women into further commitments of time and energy. 
111 Author's interview, January 1996. 
112 AMNLAE is the Nicaraguan Women's Association 'Luisa Amanda 
Espinosa'; UNO is the Union of National Opposition, the Centre-Right coalition 
led by Violeta Chamorro. 
113 For an account of this process see Criquillon (1995). 
Conclusions 
Throughout the special period, the leadership 's rhetoric has remained 
committed to the socialist path, with Castro holding up the examples of China 
and Vietnam as those which Cuba will follow, even if some specialists think 
differently.114 The future envisaged is a gradual evolution towards some 
variant of a mixed economy model under the control of the Communist Party. 
Yet this hope of a managed transition under the direction of the party was 
also the defining policy, and illusion, of the Gorbachev administration that 
came to power in the USSR in 1985; this presided over a short-lived reform 
process, aimed at first 'accelerating' and then 'restructuring' the Soviet 
system, but it quickly proceeded in the direction of economic decentralisation 
and a policy of cautious political liberalisation, glasnost, before culminating 
in the collapse of the system as a whole. 
In the Soviet case the exper iment in rev i ta l i s ing the system under 
Communist Party control lasted only four years. It was brought to an abrupt 
end in the period 1989-91 by a lethal combination of economic crisis, popular 
exhaustion, international pressure and the centrifugal forces that led to the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. It might be argued that the Castro regime has 
not faced the same diff icul t ies either in range or degree as those which 
confronted the CPSU in the late 1980s; the fact that it has survived the 
collapse of its former partners in the East by seven years, and seems to have 
weathered the worst of the recent economic shock, is seen as a testimony of 
sorts. The exodus of many thousands of balseros, 'rafters', also acted as a 
pressure valve, allowing some of the most discontented to leave, and open 
discontent has been confined so far to one riot in Havana in August 1994. 
Most observers assume that there remains some degree of critical support for 
the leadership, and some hope among the population that the reform process 
will deliver new freedoms, greater prosperity, and a rapprochement with the 
USA. 
Whether the Cuban strategy of a managed transition in these terms can 
succeed is, at least, an open question. Leaving aside the political problems 
posed by the unresolved exile issue, there is on the negative side the fact that 
Cuba faces serious economic problems which cannot be resolved in the short-
or medium-term. The long delay in bringing in the necessary reforms has 
added to these problems. While a distinguishing feature of Cuba's reform 
114 The comparison with China and Vietnam may reflect a political hope, but 
it ignores some major differences, not least the contrasted attitudes of the East 
Asian and Cuban diasporas towards investment in the home country and 
cooperation with the regime. This has had obvious consequences for the policy 
of the USA. See Carranza (1995) for a Cuban critique of this view. 
process so far has been its commitment to maintaining high levels of social 
expenditure,115 this cannot continue indefinitely and has already come under 
considerable pressure. Meanwhile, the limited trend to market relations that 
has so far occurred, together with the spread of the dollar economy, while 
indeed a l l ev ia t ing some of the wors t ha rdsh ip , has also led to r i s ing 
expectations and whetted appetites for a greater relaxation of government 
controls. 
The introduction of policies geared towards achieving some restructuring 
and allowing some movement in the direction of a market economy may 
therefore have yielded tangible, short-term benefits, but they have subjected 
Cuban society to new strains - not just of growing social inequality but also 
of forces within society which inevitably cannot be contained or controlled 
by the s ta te . There is o f f i c i a l r ecogn i t ion of the need to al low some 
development of civil society, and economic liberalisation has been accom-
panied by a modicum of glasnost and the appearance of quasi-independent 
associations of various kinds. But more intractable, and the acid test of the 
regime's legitimacy, is the question of democratisation. So far there have 
been few indications of a positive kind beyond promises of limited reforms 
to the political system some time in the future with the Party reluctant to cede 
its overall control. 
The course which the leadership is set on is not one it has chosen, and 
while it seeks to minimise its effects, social processes will be unleashed 
which are likely to have political consequences of a destabilising kind. The 
costs of adjustment, and of necessary economic reform, will be borne by a 
population already exhausted by surviving the economic downturn and which 
will, in all likelihood, see their gains of the 1995-96 period cancelled by 
inflation and rising costs. Appeals by the government to 'defend the gains of 
the revolution' would, in such a situation, run the risk of being seen as little 
more than defending the party in power, as those real gains in health and 
education suffer rapid erosion. 
The crisis of the Cuban revolution is, not surprisingly, one which has 
placed its governing institutions under considerable pressure to reform and 
to adapt to the new context. Yet here too there is a similar pattern of delay, 
of r e luc tan t and l imi ted concess ions , which reveal more than a l i t t le 
ambivalence towards political liberalisation. Beyond factors of personality 
and ideology are the structural rigidities of communist systems, which slow 
the pace of institutional change. If one of the problems faced by all ideologi-
115 The 1996 budget plan envisages a 4.4% increase in spending on 
education, a 7.1 % rise in health expenditure, and 3.1 % growth in social security 
spending. Of the Ps. 10,472 million of current expenditure, Ps. 7,057 million 
has been allocated to the social sector. 
cally driven states is that of path dependency, this is nowhere more evident 
than in the case of the Communist Parties, tied as they are in a myriad of 
ways, juridical and institutional, to their past commitments and styles of 
governance. These bonds can be broken, but at the risk of placing in question 
the very legitimacy of the regime itself, rooted as it is in the revolutionary 
process it brought about. Such is the dilemma facing the future of Cuban 
political institutions, for just as economic reform requires the retreat of the 
state, institutional reform requires surrendering the claim to monolithic party 
control , and accepting the need not just for modernisation but also for 
pluralism, and being prepared to live with the consequences. Ultimately it 
means, as it did for the FSLN in Nicaragua, a willingness to be voted out of 
power. 
The prolonged delay in responding to the reality of the crisis which affects 
Cuban socialism is seen by some as evidence of Cuban exceptionalism, and 
an indication that it is not destined to go the way of its counterparts in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The assumption is that the leadership still 
enjoys considerable popular support and that this will buy it time to get the 
economy right.116 Yet this view fails to take account of the institutional 
crisis that the regime has been suffering from for some time and which has 
intensified. It fails, too, to consider the extra strains that will be placed on 
these inst i tut ions in the dif f icul t years which inevitably lie ahead. The 
extensive apparatus of government control that is currently in place in Cuba 
has remained largely unreformed in its character and style since it was 
established in the early decades of communist party rule; as such it not only 
represents a major obstacle to any future process of democratisation that 
might come about , but it runs the fu r the r r isk that wi thout r e fo rm it 
j eopa rd i se s whatever hope , however s lender , remains for apeace fu l 
transition. There are many Cubans, within the island and without, who would 
like to see such a transition, to a regime politically democratic and socially 
just, and embodying the positive legacy of the revolution, but a combination 
of intransigence on the part of the CCP leadership and external hostility may 
prevent this from being attained. 
One point of departure for discussing the options for change is that of civil 
society. The argument with which this paper began, drawing on discussions 
now taking place within Cuba itself, is that the current crisis of the commu-
nist model is, at the same time, an opportunity - for a political change within 
the island that would build on the positive inheritance of the revolution while 
116 A survey conducted in February 1995 showed that 28 % of Cubans blamed 
the embargo entirely for the failure to achieve economic stability, while 49% 
saw it as a principal cause; and in response to a question about their priorities, 
50% declared that social and economic equality was primary, while 38% said 
individual freedom. Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Economicas (1995). 
moving away from the statist control of economy, society and politics that 
has been the hallmark of the past thirty-seven years. The argument for this 
being an opportunity, as well as a crisis, is strengthened by the very manner 
in which Cuban society itself has been altered as a result of the revolution and 
its consequences: far f rom being blocked f rom a democratisat ion and 
evolution by the communist period, and its upheavals, the contrary could 
equally be the case. Cuba possesses the social, educational and political 
preconditions for the democratisation of the country, a process unavoidable 
in the context of economic change, and one that opens the possibility of 
complet ing an evolut ion which a century of violent oscil lat ions since 
independence from Spain has to date precluded. 
A central condition of such a change, an evolution rather than a systemic 
collapse, is the development of civil society, understood as a network of 
associations and activities present within social and political life but separate 
from the state. The existence of a flourishing civil society is a necessary part 
of any democracy and complements the space occupied by other institutions 
and practices intrinsic to the democratic model: political parties on the one 
hand, and independent economic actors, and a predominantly market system, 
on the other. 
In regard to gender issues, the role of civil society is, as the experience of 
many societies shows, particularly important. While not absent from either 
the formal political realm or that of the economy, gender relations do not in 
the main form the explicit basis for activity in either of these. There are 
neither women's parties, nor are there economic groupings of an exclusively 
female character. In civil society on the other hand, be it in the form of 
NGOs, publ icat ions , neighbourhood associations or other unoff ic ia l 
groupings, gender can and does provide a basis for organisation and activity, 
and, more broadly, for the flourishing of a democratic order. It was for this 
reason that the feminist movements have for so long insisted on the need for 
autonomous women's organisations and movements: only in this way can 
women's interests find a separate, distinct and recognised articulation, and 
respond to the wishes and concerns of a female constituency. The crowding 
out of gender concerns in formal party politics, and in the economy, can be 
countered by an explicit gender-based activity within civil society as such. If 
the failure of capitalist society has been the refusal of the political and the 
economic spheres adequately to attend to gendered inequalities and issues, 
raised by women's groups within civil society, that of the socialist model has 
been the refusal to permit civil society, including that based on gender, to 
function. The domination of social activity by mass organisations subjugated 
to s t a t e c o n c e r n s , in o r g a n i s a t i o n and p o l i c y , has p r e c l u d e d such 
organisations from playing a role consonant with the needs of women. The 
fate of the FMC, for all its idiosyncrasies a standard 'transmission belt' of 
the Leninist kind, has illustrated this all too clearly. 
Cuba in the 'special period', illustrates a contradictory pattern as far as 
such an evolution is concerned, but one which it would appear, on any 
comparative or theoretical basis, cannot be indefinitely sustained. On the one 
hand, the economy has been partially liberalised, both through the entry of 
foreign capital , and through the growth of internal market relations, 
particularly that involving small businesses and farmers, and cooperatives. 
On the other hand, the leadership has prevented, and indefinitely ruled out, 
any move to an explicit polit ical plural ism, allowing the formation of 
opposition parties or any form of contested elections. Between these two 
poles has lain the area of civil society itself, and here the record is mixed. In 
two areas traditionally associated with civil society, the family and religion, 
there has been considerable change, not least because the former institution 
is seen by the regime itself, in the classic communist formulation, as 'the 
basic cel l ' of Cuban society. Of considerable importance, because not 
confined to areas traditionally designated as personal or private, has been the 
emergence of a more critical atmosphere in the arts, a process of limited 
glasnost most evident in such films as Strawberries and Chocolate and 
Guantanamera, which satirise official rhetoric, and criticise bureaucratic 
intolerance and the lack of civil liberties. At the same time, there has been 
the emergence of NGOs. The extent of this opening should not be exagger-
ated, most evidently in the fact that NGOs wishing to pursue independent 
activities with regard to human rights and censorship have been squeezed 
almost to extinction. But it would be equally mistaken not to recognise that 
a space has been opened up, and allowed to remain open, in a way that was 
impossible during the first three decades of the revolution. 
This opening up has considerable potential for women, and some signs of 
this are already evident. One has been the creation of thirteen centres of 
research on gender issues, named Catedras de la Mujer. These not only 
reflect a recognition of the importance of researching gender issues for policy 
reasons, but they are also a sign of the re-birth of Cuba 's stifled social 
sciences as a whole. The research capacity of academics working on gender 
issues has been encouraged by the gradual re -opening to in te l lec tual 
influences broader than those offered by Soviet Marxism, long the dominant 
form of permitted academic work. There have been a number of international 
workshops and conferences in Cuba as well as ties of co-operation on 
research and publication projects between Cuban gender specialists and those 
from countries such as Spain and Canada.117 
Another element in this cautious opening was the appearance in 1993 of 
MAGIN, an independent women's association, which was aimed primarily at 
117 Author's interviews with academics at the Universidad de La Habana, 
January 1996. 
women in the media and communications.1 1 8 It was originated by Mirta 
Rodriguez Calderon, a journalist and author of many of the more interesting 
articles on gender issues in Cuba which appeared in the magazine Bohemia. 
The report on MAGIN's founding conference in November 1994 explains that 
the organising committee initially came together to exchange views about 
trends in Cuban society that they were concerned about, and to discuss issues 
which were receiving inadequate attention and reflection. Among those 
mentioned were discrimination against women, the falling percentages of 
women represented in political life, and the re-appearance of stereotypical 
attitudes and behavioural patterns with regard to women. The committee 
pledged itself to respond to these and other issues through raising awareness 
in the media of these problems and gender issues more generally, and by 
deve lop ing a p r o g r a m m e of s tudy aimed at empower ing women and 
enhancing their capacity for advocacy; in the words of one collaborator, 
' these issues are simply not being taken up in Cuba, we need to develop a 
gender perspective of social reality' .1 1 9 MAGIN has since received some 
international NGO support for its activities, notably its series of seminars on 
Gender in Social Communication, Personal Growth, Sexism and Language, 
Structuring Research Projects - some of which events counted on the 
participation of women from other Latin American Women's Centres such as 
'Flora Tristan' in Peru. It has also supported the production of materials 
(dossiers, videos) for a wider diffusion, and at the end of 1994 the first issue 
of a periodical, also called MAGIN, appeared, containing reports on the 
activit ies of the association as well as articles on feminism, women in 
agriculture, and women's participation in decision-making.120 MAGIN thus 
represents a kind of analysis and practice that was hitherto invisible, in public 
form, in Cuba. Yet it is perhaps an index of the problematic status of 
independent initiatives, that while it was able to publish its magazine, it did 
not have permission to do so, and the first issue therefore bore the number 
signifying non-appearance,'0'. 
The fate of such new developments, and indeed the fate of gender issues 
as a whole , will inevitably depend on far more than the growth of civil 
society itself. As long as the Cuban state continues to dominate economy, 
polity and society in the established manner there is little that the institutions 
118 'MAGIN es una simbiosis de los conceptos de imagen e imagination, 
vinculados estrechamente con el quehacer de sus integrantes como creadoras y 
difusoras de mensajes y con la reconocida capacidad de las mujeres para sentir 
que "hay un cielo sobre nuestras cabezas".' MA GIN (1994a), p. 2. 
119 Author's interview. January 1996. 
120 MAGIN, No. 0 (1994b). The Editorial Board consisted of Irene Esther 
Ruiz, Pilar Sa, Mirta Rodriguez Calderon, Xiomara Blanco, Nora Quintana, 
Georgina Herrera, Carmen Maria Acosta, Orieta Cordeiro, and Maria Carvajal. 
of a civil society, even if tolerated, can achieve. On the other hand, a major 
crisis of the regime, accompanied by a breakdown of law and order, and 
exacerbated by the entry of armed groups from the USA, would create a 
violent chaos in which civil society would be drowned in a much more 
uncontrolled, and terrifying, confrontation. What can be asserted with some 
confidence, however, is that both at the level of social preconditions, and at 
the level of what people within the island are themselves aware of and willing 
to encourage, the opportunity for another path, one of growth towards 
democratisation, consonant with a preservation of Cuba's independence and 
the social values of the revolution, is possible. Within such a process, the 
interests of Cuba's women, long rhetorically 'represented' by a largely 
powerless bureaucratic body, and continuously depleted by the costs of 
revolutionary excess, need to achieve much greater and more independent 
articulation. In the years since the revolutionary triumph of 1959, Cuba has 
been the object of much rhetorical obfuscat ion and benevolent wishful 
thinking: there is little that such approaches can contribute to-day. Instead 
what is needed, in policy within the island and in discussion without, is a 
realistic assessment of the need and possibility of change, consonant with the 
requirements and wishes of Cuban society. It may still not be too late for this 
to occur. 
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